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The Super High Frequency Tri-band Tactical Satellite Terminal (AN!TSC-
143) is a multi-channel tactical satellite communications terminal that allows 
information to flow between major headquarters within the operational theater and 
the continental United States. The AN!TSC-143 program used an accelerated 
acquisition strategy which implemented the concepts of teaming, tailoring, 
concurrency, and Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) to accelerate the process. The 
program successfully reduced the Procurement Administrative Lead Time (P ALT) 
to 72 days, but many other challenges had to be managed during the procurement 
of this communications system. This case study examines the acquisition 
environment surrounding this procurement. The case study illustrates the 
differences between the typical acquisition environment and the communications 
systems acquisition environment. It also provides valuable insight into developing 
an acquisition strategy for similar programs. 
v 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ :: .............................. 1 
A. FOCUS OF STUDY ................................................................................................ 1 
B. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................... 1 
C. OBJECTIVES ......................................................................................................... 2 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................................................................... 3 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................ 3 
F. SCOPE OF STUDY ................................................................................................. 4 
G. ORGANIZATION ................................................................................................... 4 
II. ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................. 7 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 7 
B. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT .............................................................................. 7 
C. ACQUISITION PROCESS ..................................................................................... 9 
1. Requirements Generation ............................................................................... 10 
2. Acquisition System ......................................................................................... 10 
3. Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Process ................................................. 13 
4. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System ............................................ 22 
D. ACQUISITION STRATEGY ............................................................................... 22 
E. ARMY'S SYSTEMS ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ...... 24 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................ 26 
III. TRI-BAND TACTICAL SATELLITE TERMINAL ................................................... 29 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 29 
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION .................................................................................... 29 
C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT. ............................................................................. 30 
D. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................... 34 
1. Requirements Generation ............................................................................... 34 
2. Contracting ..................................................................................................... 36 
Vll 
3. Engineering .................................................................................................... 40 
4. Testing ............................................................................... : ............................ 42 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................ ." .............................. 45 
N. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 49 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 49 
B. ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................................. 49 
1. Management Environment ............................................................................. 49 
2. Organizational Influences .............................................................................. 53 
C. ACQUISITION PROCESS ................................................................................... 57 
1. Requirements Generations ............................................................................. 57 
2. Contracting ..................................................................................................... 62 
3. Systems Testing .............................................................................................. 72 
4. Logistics Support ............................................................................................ 76 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 78 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 81 
A CONCLUSIONS --ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS ........................ 81 
1. Primary Question ............................................................................................ 81 
2. Subsidiary Questions ...................................................................................... 82 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ..................................... 86 
APPENDIX A- ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................ 89 
APPENDIX B - SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ..................................................................... 93 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 97 




The acquisition environment surrounding the procurement of Army 
communications systems is one of continual change. The procurement of a 
communications system requires the consideration of unique issues that the normal 
developmental acquisition process does not need to contemplate. Recognizing and 
defining these issues is necessary before the normal acquisition process can be tailored to 
meet communications systems procurement requirements. 
The focus of this study will be to provide the reader with some insight into how 
the Army procures its communications systems. More specifically, this case study will 
analyze and discuss the acquisition environment surrounding communications systems 
requirements and how it differs from the normal developmental acquisition environment. 
Essential program elements to include the management, contracting, testing, and support 
issues will be analyzed. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The AN/TSC-143 terminal is a highly mobile multi-channel satellite 
communications system that provides connectivity between major headquarters within 
the operational theater and the continental United States. The need for the tri-band 
capability was proven during Desert Shield Desert Storm (DS/DS) where a lack of 
Defense Satellite. Communications System (DSCS) capacity forced the Army to rely 
heavily on leased commercial terminals operated by civilian personnel. The Army, as 
well as other component Services, spent a great deal of money leasing commercial 
terminals, in some cases at 14 times the normal cost, and took additional risks by placing 
untrained civilians in harm's way. 
The acquisition of the AN/TSC-143 satellite terminals was an urgent and highly 
visible effort. The contract required the delivery of six tri-band capable terminals to the 
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Power Projection Army Command, Control, and Communications (PowerPAC3) 
Company within six months of contract award. Although the contractor assured the 
Government that it could do the job, the program required extensive. integration of Non-
developmental Items (NDI), commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), and Government-
Furnished Equipment (GFE) into a package that was C-130 transportable. There were no 
existing satellite terminals, commercial or military, with tri-band capability contained in 
such a small deployable configuration. This fact made the program even more 
challenging and placed it at higher risk of failure. 
Several factors, such as the internal and external organizational influences, the 
urgent need, the constraints of the acquisition process, and other imposed constraints 
created an environment that required tight management of the program. Creative 
methods of streamlining the process, while ensuring that a fully operational system was 
delivered, had to be implemented. An acquisition program in this constrained 
environment had to identify problems and incorporate solutions rapidly just to keep the 
program on schedule. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this case study is to identify the challenges associated with the 
fielding of an urgent communications requirement in today' s acquisition environment. 
More specifically, this study will analyze the differences between the standard 
developmental acquisition environment and the accelerated acquisition environment 
surrounding communications systems procurement. A detailed analysis of the 
differences will provide a better understanding of the various influences on the 
acquisition of communications systems. The results of the analysis provide lessons 
learned and recommendations to program managers (PM) in similar acquisition 
environments. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question: 
What is the current acquisition environment surrounding communications systems 
procurement? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions: 
a. Why is the communications acquisition environment continually 
changing? 
b. What are the characteristics of this changing acquisition environment? 
c. How does the AN/TSC-143 program illustrate this environment? 
d. How did the ANffSC-143 program proceed in this environment? 
e. What can we learn from the ANffSC-143 program about managing 
communications programs in this environment of rapid change? 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The first objective of this research paper is to provide a comprehensive summary 
of the literature pertaining to the Department of Defense (DoD) systems acquisition 
polices, processes, and strategies. This literature review provided background 
information on the acquisition and fielding ofDoD's major weapon systems. The 
literature review provides the basis and the structure for the analysis in Chapter IV. The 
Primary sources of information include current acquisition directives and instructions and 
Army regulations and guidance on acquisition reform. Additional sources included 
Defense Systems Management College publications. 
The second phase involved a comprehensive examination of the entire AN/TSC-
143 acquisition and the impact of various internal and external influences on the 
program. An analysis of the differences between the AN/TSC-143's accelerated 
acquisition process and the normal developmental acquisition process as stated in the 
literature review provides an understanding of the unique environment surrounding 
procurement of communications systems. Gathering information on the AN/TSC-143 
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terminal procurement required numerous interviews with personnel from the Program 
Management Office (PMO) and Army commands providing support services to PMs. 
These commands included the Communications Electronics Command (CECOM), 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Operational Test and Evaluation 
Command (OPTEC), and the United States Army Information Systems Command 
(USAISC). Additional information was gathered from Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA); the office of the Director of Information Systems Command, Control, 
Communications, and Computers (DISC4); the Army's Research, Development and 
Acquisition (RD&A) and Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association 
(AFCEA) Signal journal articles; after action reports; Internet web pages; and lessons 
learned from the PMO, OPTEC, and the fielded unit. 
F. SCOPE OF STUDY 
This study analyzes the acquisition environment surrounding the acquisition of 
the Army's communications systems, specifically, the SHF Tri-band Tactical Satellite 
Terminal (AN!fSC-143). The period covered begins at the program's inception on 22 
October 1993 and ends upon the terminals' acceptance on 15 April1996. The various 
influences affecting the development of the terminal's mission need, performance 
requirements, acquisition strategy, source selection, testing, and fielding are analyzed. 
The analysis brings out the unique characteristics of communications systems 
procurement. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of five chapters (I-V). Chapter I included a brief introduction 
and described the objectives of this thesis. Chapter II provides an overview ofthe 
defense systems acquisition environment and discusses acquisition polices and processes. 
Additionally, it defines acquisition strategy and the need for streamlining acquisition to 
maintain a technological edge. Chapter ill outlines the development of the AN/TSC-143 
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program and thoroughly discusses the events leading to customer acceptance of the 
terminals. Chapter IV analyzes the data collected from the research conducted in 
Chapters ll and Ill. Chapter V summarizes the analysis from the preVious chapter. It 
uses the results from the research and analysis to draw conclusions, answer research 




ll. ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a description of the overall acquisition environment and the 
systems acquisition process as it applies to DoD. This chapter also introduces the reader 
to acquisition strategy and the NDI procurement process. A brief summary of the Army's 
systems acquisition environment and the organizations involved is also included. This 
material provides the framework needed to understand and analyze the specific 
challenges associated with managing program requirements and the influences that affect 
the acquisition process. 
B. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
For the past 40 years the military has been focused on countering a Soviet threat. 
The military has produced operational plans and weapon systems capable of defeating 
huge Soviet forces crossing into Germany through the Fulda Gap. With the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the United States military was in search of a new mission. DoD 
was concerned that the collapse of the Soviet military would dramatically reduce the 
funds Congress authorized for defense. This in turn would likely lead to a reduction in 
force (RIF), closing of numerous military installations, and massive restructuring of the 
component Services. In response to the fall of the Soviet Union and Congressional 
pressure to justify the military requirements, President Clinton ordered a review of likely 
military threats to U.S. interests. The President had the Secretary of Defense formulate a 
strategy and mission plan to defeat those potential threats. The results of the review were 
reported in September 1993. It envisioned the military's mission as fighting two major 
regional conflicts (MRC) nearly simultaneously using a revised strategy of power 
projection rather than forward presence. The new mission and strategy allowed for 
considerable reductions in the military's personnel, equipment requirements, and 
installations. 
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The perceived reduction in threat allowed the public's interest to move toward 
more socioeconomic concerns. The public's and therefore Congress' focus after the end 
of the Cold War shifted toward the budget deficit and a desire to balance the budget. The 
amount of public attention the budget was receiving, combined with the perceived size of 
the defense budget, obligated the President and Congress to reduce the amount of 
discretionary spending. In 1995, defense spending made up approximately 62 percent of 
the discretionary spending in the Federal budget [Ref 1: p. 3]. The reduced budget has 
forced the military's leadership to make some tough decisions between modernization of 
weapon systems and maintaining the force structure and readiness. 
To help relieve the budget pressures, several reform initiatives were undertaken 
following the Cold War to make the Government more efficient and effective in carrying 
out its functions. Vice President Gore's National Performance Review pressured Federal 
Government agencies, including DoD, to "work better and cost less~" DoD is 
accomplishing this by promoting innovation in the workplace, practicing good business 
judgment, and implementing changes to laws, regulations, and processes that impede 
smart practices. [Ref 2: p.l] 
DoD's acquisition process came under increasing scrutiny due to several factors: 
(1) the public's perception of fraud, waste, and abuse in Government procurement, (2) 
the need to field state-of-the-art equipment, and (3) the reduced defense budget. 
Acquisition reform became a catch-phrase in DoD, and a cultural change began to take 
effect at the higher levels. The passing of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994 (F ASA ), the recent release of the new DoD 5000 series documents, and the 
automated Defense Acquisition Deskbook indicate that progress is being made. 
As the Army downsized to fit the new mission requirements, it implemented 
several reform initiatives to streamline the acquisition process. The goals of the 
streamlined process were to field affordable state-of-the-art weapon systems capable of 
countering emerging threats. The Army's Acquisition Executive (AAE), Gilbert F. 
Decker, has challenged the Army acquisition community to analyze and control what it 
does, cut through red tape, and eliminate low value items. Mr. Decker has suggested 
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some simple rules to follow in deciding whether or not to implement a streamlining 
technique: 
• Does it make good business sense? 
• Is it legal and ethical? 
• Is the PM willing to be held accountable (or take credit) for it? 
• Is it consistent with the PM's mission? [Ref 3: p. 1] 
The rapidly changing external environment has led to DoD's mission, funding, 
force structure, and weapon programs to be continuously under question and review. 
DoD's acquisition environment revolves around a continuous process of improvement 
and reform focused on re-engineering the Government's acquisition system. 
C. ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The Federal acquisition process revolves around three decision-making areas as 
shown in Figure 1. They are requirements generation, the acquisition system, and the 
Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). For the acquisition process to 
function efficiently, it is important that these three support systems work together 
effectively. 
Figure 1. Acquisition Decision-Making Processes [Ref 4: p. 8] 
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1. Requirements Generation 
Requirements are generated from assessments of the military's capability to 
accomplish its assigned mission based on the future threat. The result ofthe assessment 
is the Mission Area Analysis (MAA), which identifies deficiencies in the military's 
capabilities. Once the MAA has identified a deficiency, alternative solutions are 
examined in order to resolve the deficiency. Non-material solutions are looked at first 
followed by: modification of existing system, modification of existing Allied system, new 
joint-service program, or a new service unique development program. [Ref. 4: p. 21] 
If a non-material solution is not feasible, then a Mission Need Statement (MNS) 
is generated for a material solution. The MNS is a nonsystem-specific statement that 
defines the mission need in broad operational terms, identifies the threat to be countered 
as well as the projected threat environment in which the system needs to operate. For 
Army communications systems, the U.S. Army Signal Center, a component ofTRADOC, 
is responsible for performing MAA and generating the MNS. Depending on the 
acquisition category (ACAT) of the program, the MNS is then forwarded to the 
appropriate operational authority for validation and approval. For ACAT I programs the 
MNS is approved and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 
and a recommendation forwarded to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) for a decision 
on how to continue. For ACAT II-III (ACAT N programs are now managed by systems 
commands) the MNS is approved and validated by the Service chief and forwarded to the 
component acquisition executive for action. [Ref. 4: p. 22-23] 
2. Acquisition System 
a) Acquisition Rules 
The acquisition system is governed by statutes, regulations, specifications, 
standards, and various other forms of administration. Statutes provide direction for 
policy and procedure and are implemented through regulations and executive agencies. 
They are proposed, issued, and interpreted by several authorities, such as agency heads, 
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congressional committees, boards, commissions, and courts. Procurement rules have 
been expanded annually, and are issued according to procedures and authorities granted 
by Congress. The rules are subject to interpretation and present some practicable 
challenges for managers attempting to improve the acquisition process. [Ref 5: p.2] 
b) Packard Commission 
The Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, the Packard 
Commission, was established by Executive Order 12526 on July 15, 1985. The President 
directed the commission to study defense management polices and procedures, including 
organizational and operational arrangements. In June 1986 the Packard Commission 
published its report. In its findings the Packard Commission noted that, " ... all too many 
of our weapon systems cost too much, take too long too develop, and, by the time they 
are fielded, incorporate obsolete technology." The commission also recognized an 
increasingly bureaucratic and over-regulated process, and recommended changes 
including some of the following to improve the overall system: 
• Greater use of off-the-shelf components, systems and services. New 
or custom-made products should be developed only when there are 
none available in the open market to meet military requirements. 
• A high priority should be given to building and testing prototype 
systems before moving to full-scale development. Prototyping will let 
us "fly and know how much it will cost before we buy." 
• Use of prototypes for early operational testing, which begins in the 
advanced development phase and goes on through full-scale 
development 
Actions have been taken to make many of the changes recommended 
by the Packard Commission. [Ref 11: p. 4-5] 
c) Defense Management Review 
The Defense Management Review (DMR) reiterated the Packard 
Commission fmdings. The objectives of the review were: defense strength and 
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readiness; new weapon systems at less cost and time; ensured achievement of planned 
performance; highest standards of integrity; and greater public confidence in 
administration by DoD. The DMR further addressed the need to rely on administrative 
leadership and effective managers to make the system work. It called for management 
improvement actions by DoD, by the administration, and by Congress. [Ref. 5: p. 110] 
To create clear channels of command, the DMR specified that the civilian 
Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) would be responsible for all acquisition functions. 
For each group of programs in a Service, a Program Executive Officer (PEO) would 
operate under the SAE to manage assigned programs. PMs would report to the PEO and 
SAE. Systems and material commands within the Services are required to support 
programs but not duplicate the PEO or SAE management functions. [Ref. 5: p. 111] 
To incorporate better systems development practices, the report addressed 
revisions in areas of procurement policies affecting competition, commercial products 
acquisition, and DoD's ability to employ commercial practices. Emphasis was placed on 
the use of prototypes at both the system and subsystem levels. The review also 
emphasized early, operationally realistic testing of prototypes. [Ref. 5: p. 110-114] 
d) Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 
A new, simplified, acquisition environment was created with the 
enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. FASA, a major element 
of the President's "Reinventing Government" initiative, removed many of the barriers 
that precluded much of the U.S. industrial base from participating in the Defense market. 
Of the more than 650 unique laws regulating Government procurements, F ASA repealed 
55 laws and modified 175 others. F ASA expanded the definition of "commercial 
products" and eliminated many of the unique requirements imposed on sales to DoD. It 
encouraged Government agencies to use commercial end-items and components, and 
required transition to an electronic (computer-based) procurement system. [Ref. 12: p. 
32] 
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3. Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Process 
The major weapon systems acquisition process assists the PM in developing, 
contracting, producing, testing, and supporting the validated mission requirements of the 
Armed Services. The changes enacted by F ASA and implemented in the new DoD 5000 
series publications will help enable PMs to provide the warfighter with weapon systems 
that are affordable and capable of defeating any emerging threat. 
The major weapon systems acquisition process emerged from a study by the Blue 
Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970 and the issuance ofDoD Directive 5000.1 in 1971. 
Further refmement came in 1976 when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
published Circular A-109, titled "Major System Acquisition." O:MB Circular A-109 
provides policy and guidance for the acquisition of major systems for Federal agencies, 
including DoD. The polices established by OMB Circular A-109 are intended to ensure 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the major system acquisition process. Guidance for 
implementation of this policy has recently been updated and is provided in DoD 
Directive (DoDD) 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition" and DoD Regulation 5000.2-R, 
"Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major 
Automated Information System (MAJS) Acquisition Programs." Army Regulation (AR) 
70-1, "Army Acquisition Policy," implements DoD directives. 
a) Acquisition Milestones and Phases 
Providing operational military forces the weapon system resources needed 
to accomplish DoD objectives is the purpose of the acquisition process. The acquisition 
process is a sequence of activities that begins with the identification of a mission need, 
and extends through the introduction of a system into operational use. [Ref. 6: p. 11] The 
acquisition process described in DoD 5000.2-R is a sequence of program activity phases, 
milestone reviews, and decision points that lead to the fielding of fully supportable 
systems. It is structured in four phases, each separated by a major decision point or 
milestone as shown in Figure 2. This framework provides both a management and 
decision-making forum that facilitates the long-term acquisition process. 
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Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Determination 
of Mission Concept Program Engineering & Production, Fielding/ 
Need Exploration Definition & Manufacturing Deployment, & 
Risk Reduction Development Operational Support 
Milestone 0 Milestone I Milestone II Milestone III 
Approval Approval to Approval to Production or 
to Conduct Begin New enter Fielding/ 
Concept Acquisition Engineering & Deployment 
Studies Program Manufacturing Approval 
Develooment 
Figure 2. Acquisition Milestones and Phases [Ref. 7: p. 14] 
Milestone 0, Approval to conduct Concept Studies, determines if a 
documented mission need warrants a study of alternative concepts to satisfy the 
identified mission need. Approval at this milestone results in an Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM) being sent to the Service office responsible for acquisition and 
initiates Phase 0, Concept Exploration. Studies of alternative concepts are conducted to 
identify the most favorable solutions to validated user needs. The component Service 
responsible for acquisition performs a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
(COEA) and prepares the Operational Requirements Document (ORD). A PM is 
appointed during this phase to prepare the acquisition strategy, plans, and Acquisition 
Program Baseline (APB) before entering the Milestone I review. The APB document is 
the contract between the PM and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) that identifies 
cost, schedule, and performance objectives. 
Milestone I, Approval to Begin a New Acquisition Program, determines if 
the results of Phase 0 justify establishing a new acquisition program. A successful 
Milestone I review authorizes the start of a new program, and begins Phase I, Program 
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR). Phase I further develops, demonstrates, and 
validates the most favorable alternative concepts. The critical design characteristics and 
expected capabilities of the system concept are clearly defined. Technical risk and cost 
drivers are identified and trade-offs made to reduce program risks. Funding requirements 
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are programmed into the PPBS during this phase as well as the formal designation of a 
PM. 
Milestone ll, Approval for Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD), determines if adequate resources are available, if technology is attainable, and if 
the threat is still valid. The program's acquisition strategy and low rate production 
quantities, if required, are approved at this milestone. A developmental baseline is 
established to identify program cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Phase ll, 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development, will translate the design approach with the 
most potential into a stable, producible, and cost effective system design. 
Milestone ill, Approval for Production or Fielding/Deployment, is the 
decision point for the final acquisition strategy and production baseline. Approval at this 
milestone demonstrates a commitment to build, deploy, and support the system. Phase 
ill, Production, Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support, begins the deployment of 
the operational systems to tactical units. Phase III has been expanded to include the 
logistical support of the system, monitoring system performance, identifying 
shortcomings and deficiencies, and modifying the system. Once the system becomes 
obsolete, disposal instructions are requested. The disposal of the system signifies the end 
ofPhaseill. 
DoD 5000.2-R requires that a SAE assign program responsibility to a PEO 
within three months after program initiation. [Ref 8: p. 13 part 3] The PM, or Material 
Developer (MA TDEV), assumes responsibility for managing the program during each 
phase of the acquisition process. When discharging its responsibilities, the MATDEV 
must not only ensure that the system meets minimum performance requirements, but also 
that it is delivered on schedule, in the required quantities, and within approved budget 
ceiling. 
This acquisition process evolves a system from a paper description of a 
concept to hardware that will go into production and fielding. The acquisition of a 
defense system can take from eight to 16 years starting with identification of a mission 
requirement to fielding of the system. During those eight to 16 years, the program is 
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controlled through the periodic business and technical decisions of the acquisition 
process. [Ref 9: p. viii] 
b) Contracting 
Contracting is a major part of the acquisition process. As depicted in 
Figure 3, there are seven steps to the contracting process, not including the pre- and post-
contracting processes. The formal contracting process begins with the acquisition plan. 
The acquisition plan provides a means by which the acquisition team can integrate its 
efforts into a coordinated and unified process. The Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA) of 1984 requires "advance procurement planning and market research" that the 
acquisition plan provides. 
PRE-CONTRACT PROCESSES 
Review of Mission 
Determine Mission Need Purchase Acquisition Source Selection Requirements Determination J.<equest Plan Plan Requirement Identification!Definitio 
IFBIRFP I ~-·········································~79~~~~.~?~.~~~ ........................................ = 
Source Proposals Source Discussions 
Solicitation Evaluation/ Negotiation Selection 
Selection with or "'itbout discussions J 
.~ 
POST -CONTRACT 
Contract Debriefing Contract PROCESSES 
Award Administration Ownership 
Disposal 
Figure 3. Contracting Process 
The next step is developing the Source Selection Plan (SSP). The SSP 
begins the solicitation phase of the contracting process. Documentation and procedures 
for solicitation of proposals are created. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 
15.612 states the minimum requirements that the SSP should include: 
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• Description of the organization structure 
• Proposed pre-solicitation activities 
• Summary of the acquisition strategy 
• Statement of the proposed evaluation factors and any significant subfactors 
and their relative importance 
• Description of the evaluation process, methodology, and techniques to be used 
• Schedule of significant milestones 
Once the SSP is approved by the Source Selection Authority (SSA), the 
contracting officer prepares the Request for Proposals (RFP) to solicit potential offerors. 
FAR Part 15 outlines the solicitation process and requirements for requesting proposals. 
Once offerors have responded to the solicitation with their proposals, an evaluation of the 
proposal is conducted. The purpose of this process is to determine how well each offeror 
can meet the contract requirements. The Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), 
Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC), and the SSA use the factors established in 
the RFP solicitation in making the source selection decision. To get the "Best Value" the 
contracting officer conducts negotiations with offerors in the competitive range. Upon 
receipt of offerors Best and Final Offers (BAFO) the evaluation process is conducted one 
final time. Following the final evaluation a recommendation is presented to the SSA. 
Award ofthe contract is made to the winning offeror as quickly as possible once the SSA 
determines which offer provides the "Best Value" to the Government. Within three days 
after the date of contract award, the contracting officer shall notify, in writing or 
electronically, each offeror whose proposal is determined to be unacceptable or whose 
offer is not selected for award. To the maximum extent practicable, a debriefing should 
occur within five days after receipt of the written request for debriefing. 
The contracting process continues into the contract administration phase. 
There are 69 functions listed in FAR subpart 42.302 that the Contract Administration 
Office (CAO) shall perform. The 69 functions are encompassed under five major 
categories: (1) monitoring or surveillance, (2) review and approval, (3) determinations, 
(4) negotiations, and (5) issuance and control. 
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c) Testing 
Test and evaluation of a system are a critical part of the acquisition 
process. "Test" denotes the actual testing of hardware and software to obtain data. 
These test data are valuable in developing new capabilities, managing the process, and 
making decisions on allocation of resources. "Evaluation" denotes the process whereby 
data are logically assembled and analyzed to aid in making systematic decisions. "Test 
and Evaluation" is the process by which a system or components are compared to 
requirements and specifications through testing. [Ref 9: p. 29] 
The role of test and evaluation in a NDI acquisition is exactly the same as 
in a typical developmental acquisition program. There is need for thorough, logical, 
systematic, and early test planning. It is also necessary to provide feedback in the form 
of well-documented, unbiased test and evaluation (T &E) results to system developers, 
users, and decision makers. The purpose ofT &E in a defense system's development and 
acquisition program is to identify the areas of risk that need to be reduced or eliminated. 
During the early phases of development, T &E is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility 
of conceptual approaches, to minimize design risk, to identify design alternatives, to 
compare and analyze tradeoffs, and to estimate operational effectiveness and suitability. 
[Ref 9: p. 38] 
The testing process involves several agencies which must be brought 
together throughout the system's acquisition cycle as shown in Figure 4. The PMO, Test 
and Evaluation Command (TECOM), OPTEC, Army Material Systems Analysis Agency 
(AMSAA), Combat Developer (CBTDEV), and contractor are all involved in the test and 
evaluation plan. They meet formally through the Test Integration Working Groups 
(TIWG). 
The PM is ultimately responsible for all aspects of the system 
development, to include coordinating the total T &E program. The PM normally has a 
deputy or assistant whose responsibilities include the supervision of testing as well as 
writing various test documents and reports. The PMO is responsible for writing reports 
and plans such as the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The information 
contained in the TEMP is influenced by the TIWG. The PM establishes and uses the 
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TIWG to help coordinate, plan, and discuss the testing and analysis effort. TIWG 
members include representatives from the development agency, the user, both 
developmental and operational T &E agencies, logistics, analysis, and training 
organizations. [Ref 16: p. 4-1] 
Secretary of the Army 
ASA(RD&A) t---------+---------1 DUSA(OR) 
PEOs/PMs 
Figure 4. Army Test and Evaluation Structure [Ref 16: p.3-6] 
TECOM is the Army's developmental testing agency. TECOM, as 
presented in Figure 5, has facilities throughout the U.S. as well as locations outside the 
continental U.S. These subordinate facilities provide the people, equipment, and other 
resources to conduct various types ofT &E. TECOM, through its various facilities, is 
responsible for planning, executing, and reporting the results of technical tests. 
Technical tests include development tests, technical feasibility tests, production 
qualification tests, joint tests, and contractor tests. TECOM is charged with maintaining 
the Army's major range and test facility base (MRTFB), maintaining the Army's T&E 
data base and researching, developing, and acquiring instrumentation and improved test 
methodology. [Ref 16: p. 3-5] 
The prime contractor is responsible for providing the Government with the 
required product. The prime contractor conducts its testing before Government tests and 
demonstrates that it is prepared to enter into Government conducted, or at least observed, 
testing. The contractor's testing during the initial phases of the acquisition cycle is likely 
to impact testing conducted by the Government during later phases. The contractor may 
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even conduct some tests, observed by the Government, within its facility. [Ref. 16: p. 7-
3] 
Army Material Command 
(AMC) 
Army Material Systems 
Ana lysis Activity 
(AMSAA) 

























Figure 5. AMC and TECOM Structure [Ref 16] 
Simulation, Training and 
Instrumentation Command 
(STRICOM) 
AMSAA is AMC's independent evaluator for the T&E process often 
referred to as the "honest broker." AMSAA is responsible for the Independent 
Evaluation Plan (IEP) as well as advising the tester and the program office on analytical 
issues, testing, and test documentation. AMSAA exerts influence on the statistical 
process controls of the tests in areas such as sample size, confidence levels, and test 
design. AMSAA conducts the analysis and evaluation of the testing and provides 
members to the TIWG. [Ref. 16: p. 3-5] 
The CBTDEV is usually the "user" or the organization that represents the 
user and identifies the need for the system being developed. These agencies develop the 
doctrine and training for their respective branches based on overall Army tactics, 
doctrine, and guidance. They provide the MNS that initiates the development of a new 
system or the modification of an older system. [Ref. 17: p. 4] 
d) Logistics Support 
Another key area of program management is integrating the logistics 
support requirements for maintaining the system throughout its lifecycle. The focus of 
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logistics support is on getting maintenance and repair parts support to the systems in the 
fielded units. 
The maintenance plan addresses requirements related to such issues as 
level of repair, modification processes, facilities, personnel, and training. The Army uses 
a three-level repair model consisting of: Organizational, Intermediate, and Depot. The 
level of repair decision specifies the organizational level where a particular item will be 
repaired. This decision will either (1) generate a new repair capability, or (2) take 
advantage of an existing repair capability. Additionally, the repair of a particular item 
can be either (1) entirely supported at a single level, or (2) divided between several levels 
of repair. [Ref. 18: p. 308] 
The first level of maintenance is called the Organizational level and is 
frequently referred to as the "operator" level. The maintenance tasks performed at this 
level include inspections, cleaning, lubrication, servicing, and minor adjustments. The 
relatively low maintenance skill levels required, at this level of repair, allow the 
maintenance technician to use checklists. [Ref. 18: p. 310] 
The second level is the Intermediate, or field level. This level usually 
employs more highly trained personnel who perform component repairs. Some of the 
tasks may include adjustment, repair, extensive inspection, testing, and rebuilding of 
certain components. The testing and inspections performed at this level frequently 
require special tools, equipment, and test stations. [Ref. 18: p. 311] 
The third level is the Depot level and includes: major modifications, 
alterations, inspections with disassembly, and retrofitting. This level of maintenance 
requires extensive maintenance training, and even engineering skills. The contractor 
who developed the item may become involved with maintenance at this level. The Depot 
possesses extensive tools and support equipment in order to perform maintenance. [Ref. 
18: p. 311] 
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4. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
The PPBS was created by Secretary ofDefense McNamara in 1960, to provide a 
formal structure for making decisions concerning the costs associated with the 
development of major weapon systems. The PPBS is DoD's official management system 
that uses programming to provide a bridge between the planning and budgeting of major 
weapon systems. The objective ofPPBS is to assist DoD in making decisions about 
which major weapon systems are to be submitted in the President's budget given the 
budgetary constraints. [Ref 4: p. 29-30] 
D. ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The acquisition strategy provides the framework for achieving program objectives 
within resource constraints. It defines essential program elements to include the 
management, technical, resource, procurement and contracting, testing, training, 
deployment, support, and any other aspects critical to the success of the program. The 
acquisition strategy is formulated during Phase 0, Concept Exploration and Definition, 
and approved at the Milestone I decision. The acquisition strategy is updated during the 
subsequent acquisition phases, and approved at each milestone review. The primary goal 
in developing an acquisition strategy is to modify the acquisition process to achieve the 
optimal balance between cost, schedule, and performance objectives within basic 
policies established by DoDD 5000.1. [Ref. 8: p. 3 part 3] 
DoD 5000.2-R allows the MATDEV to modify the acquisition process whenever 
and wherever practical. Modification of the acquisition process is known as tailoring. 
The results of tailoring the acquisition process is a reduction in administrative delays, 
program costs, and schedule. 
Following the guidance of DoD 5000.2-R, MATDEVs look for existing systems 
that can be employed "as is," or can be slightly modified to meet requirements. The term 
NDI covers material available from a wide variety of sources with little or no 
development effort required by the Government. [Ref. 9: p. 3] If an existing or modified 
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system can meet stated requirements, the system can be procured using a NDI acquisition 
strategy. [Ref 9: p. viii] The NDI acquisition strategy focuses on procurement of 
commercially available systems that may require slight modifications·to support military 
requirements. A NDI system is defined in DoD 5000.2-R as: 
( 1) Any previously developed item of supply used exclusively for 
governmental purposes by a Federal Agency, a State or local 
government, or a foreign government with which the United States has 
a mutual defense cooperation agreement. 
(2) Any item described in (1) that requires only minor modification or 
modifications of the type customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace to meet the requirements of the procuring department or 
agency. 
(3) Any item described in (1) or (2) solely because the item is not yet in 
use (FAR 2.101 12). [Ref 8: p. 5 part 3] 
The Army has slightly altered the definition and application ofNDI acquisition. 
The Army uses three distinct NDI categories: 
(1) Off-the-shelf or basic NDI-- products that are used in the same 
environment for which they were designed and no developmental 
modifications are required. 
(2) NDI adaptation -- products needing adaptation for use in an 
environment different from that for which they were designed. 
(3) NDI integration-- products requiring integration ofNDI components 
and subsystems. [Ref 9: p. 3] 
A NDI acquisition strategy requires the use of a tailored version of the standard 
acquisition process. Tailoring includes approaches such as overlapping, combining, or 
deleting phases of the acquisition process. The tailored acquisition process should allow 
the most efficient process of meeting program requirements, with regard to the degree of 
risk involved. Tailoring the acquisition process through the use of a NDI strategy 
provides many opportunities as well as challenges that the PM must consider. [Ref 9: p. 
4] 
A NDI strategy permits a shortened acquisition process, which allows for a rapid 
response to an operational need. NDI systems can be fielded in considerably less time 
than full developmental systems as shown in Figure 6. This can be extremely important 
for programs where the mission need is urgent. [Ref. 9: p. 4] 
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Standard Acquisition process 8-16 years 
I 2 years 2-4 years 2-5 years 2-5 years 
so MSI MSII MSIII I Deploy I 
Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Concept Program Engineering & Production, Fielding/ 
Exploration Definition & Manufacturing Deployment, & 
Risk Reduction Development Operational Support 
so ~ IMSI I I MSII I I Msrnl I Deploy I 
I 1 year None 1-2 years 1-2 years 
NDI Acquisition Process 3-5 years 
Figure 6. Comparison of Standard and NDI Acquisition Process [Ref. 13: p. 2] 
NDI also pose challenges not associated with full development programs. 
Performance trade-offs may be required to gain the advantages from pursuing a NDI 
acquisition. Operational suitability and the performance capabilities of a NDI system 
may require trade-offs since a NDI has been developed for other than DoD needs. The 
PM must ensure that the NDI system meets the user's needs and operates properly in the 
user's environment. [Ref. 9: p. 4] 
E. ARMY'S SYSTEMS ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The acquisition environment surrounding Army weapon systems procurement is 
complex, dynamic, and tends to focus resources on ACAT I and II procurements. The 
emphasis on acquisition reform has allowed the Army to create an organization solely 
dedicated to the procurement of its major weapon systems. Following the guidance of 
the DMR, the Army has streamlined the hierarchy involved in the material development 
and logistics support of its systems. 
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The Army's acquisition needs are primarily managed by three separate, but 
intertwined Army organizations: (1) Army MATDEVs, (2) AMC support centers, and (3) 
TRADOC CBTDEV. Each of these organizations is instrumental in-developing, fielding, 
and supporting all weapon systems throughout their life-cycle, as depicted in Figure 7. 
J Reporting Chain Secretary of the Defense 
Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition) 
TSMs R&D/Test Centers 
Battlelabs Contracting Centers · · · · ·! 
Logistics Centers · · · · · · 
Figure 7. Acquisition Systems Organizational Relationships 
PEOs are the MATDEVs for all the Army's major weapon systems. The PEO 
reports to the AAE, and oversees assigned programs to ensure that all necessary support 
is available. The PEO provides the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 
necessary to guide assigned programs through the acquisition process. The PEO ensures 
that functional (matrix) support to subordinate PMs is planned and coordinated with the 
supporting organization. The PEO approves acquisition plans for assigned programs 
once concurrence is obtained from the contracting officer, the special competition 
advocate, the appropriate matrix elements from the supporting command, and the small 
or disadvantaged business utilization office. [Ref. 14: p. 2-2] 
The program, project, or product managers plan and manage acquisition programs 
consistent with the policies and procedures issued by the AAE and appropriate 
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publications. The PMs develop and submit requirements for financial, personnel, and 
contractor support to the PEO. The PMs coordinate for required functional support from 
the appropriate materiel command. 
The Army Material Command (AMC) is tasked to buy, develop, field, and 
support all weapon systems for the Army's warfighter. AMC focuses its efforts in three 
special "core" centers: (1) Logistics and Readiness Centers (LRCs); (2) Research and 
Development Centers (RDECs); and (3) Acquisition Centers. AMC's major subordinate 
commands (MACOMs) work with the PMs to map out material acquisition strategies to 
take the warfighter' s needs from research, through engineering design and manufacturing 
development, to final acquisition and fielding. AMC's subordinate commands provide 
matrix support to all PEOs, PMs, and Project offices in testing, engineering, contracting 
and cost analysis, quality assurance, and logistics support. AMC works closely with 
TRADOC Centers to help establish the final requirements for new weapon systems. The 
PM, AMC, and TRADOC work together to determine how these requirements can best 
be met within the guidelines, approval, and available funding provided by Congress and 
DoD. [Ref. 15: p.l] 
TRADOC is the CBTDEV for all Army weapon systems. It develops, evaluates, 
and approves U.S. Army doctrine and materiel requirements, and plans and evaluates 
these products as required to support decisions. Additionally, the CBTDEV prepares and 
coordinates the Critical Operational Issue and Criteria (COIC) for materiel systems and 
information systems having tactical missions. The CBTDEV approves the COIC for 
those systems that are not reserved for approval by the Office of the Deputy Chief of 
Staff Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
DoD's acquisition system is influenced by continuous change in both the internal 
and external environments. The trend has been toward a simplified and more flexible 
system that can provide the user with a quality product in a relatively short time. 
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Acquisition reform has become DoD's key initiative to maintaining modernization of 
weapon systems while reducing the defense budget. 
This chapter introduced the reader to some of the factors and key initiatives that 
have transformed the defense systems acquisition process. It also described the decision 
making process in terms of requirements generation, the acquisition system, and PPBS. 
A description of DoD's standard acquisition process and how it can be tailored using 
NDI to meet the changing environmental conditions or constraints were also presented. 
Finally, a brief summary of the various organizations influencing the acquisition of Army 
weapon systems was provided to indicate the complex relationships that the acquisition 
process must embrace. 
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m. TRI-BAND TACTICAL SATELLITE TERMINAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide the reader with an understanding of the framework and 
background in which the AN/TSC-143 system was acquired. First, a brief description of 
the AN/TSC-143 terminal and an outline of the program's management history will be 
presented. Second, this chapter will describe the acquisition environment and summarize 
the major events that took place up to customer acceptance of the terminals. This 
information provides the necessary background for understanding the acquisition 
environment and the impact of the various streamlining initiatives. A sequence of events 
is included in Appendix B. 
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The Prototype Tri-band Tactical Satellite Terminal incorporates a combination of 
COTS, NDI, and GFE components. The terminal, as shown in Figure 8, is a self-
contained unit mounted on a single Heavy High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HHMMWV), and is roll-on, roll-off deployment capable via C-130 aircraft. The 
terminal operates in the Super High Frequency (SHF) range and has significantly higher 
communications throughput than existing military satellite terminals. The terminal has 
the flexibility of accessing both military and commercial satellite constellations on three 
separate frequency bands. Additionally, a switch has been integrated into the system that 
supports up to 35 subscribers (expandable up to 200) and is interoperable with Mobile 
Subscriber Equipment (MSE) and Tri-Service Tactical (TRITAC) communications 
networks. [Ref 21: p. 1-2] 
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Figure 8. ANffSC-143, Tri-band Tactical Satellite Terminal 
C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
The AN/TSC-143 procurement presented some difficult challenges to the PM. 
The swift notification process, lack of formal (written) direction, and unrealistic cost and 
. schedule constraints were but a few of the obstacles placed in the program's path. The 
added turmoil of the military downsizing, restructuring, pressure to succeed, and turnover 
also had a significant impact on the program's management. A brief outline of the events 
that took place from a program management perspective follows. 
The PEO for Army Communications (PEO COMM) and the PM Satellite 
Communications (PM SATCOM) were notified telephonically, by a representative from 
the DCSOPS on 23 September 1993, ofthe need for a tri-band capable terminal. During 
the conversation, the DC SOPS representative stated that the program office should use a 
NDI and COTS based acquisition process, limit the procurement to six terminals, and not 
exceed $9.9 million in program cost. The DCSOPS representative stated that further 
guidance would be provided later. 
PM SATCOM immediately set up a special project office headed by a Special 
Project Officer (SPO), Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Sidwell, and composed of functional 
experts from CECOM to oversee the acquisition process. The SPO worked with 
TRADOC Systems Manager (TSM) SATCOM, and industry to develop and refine the 
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performance requirements of this terminal. The SPO's efforts focused on balancing 
performance requirements with cost and schedule constraints to ensure the user's needs 
were adequately met. 
The schedule constraint was seen as the most difficult challenge, and a 
tremendous amount of effort was placed on reducing cycle time. The SPO received 
dedicated matrix support from CECOM. This enabled him to use a dedicated, goal-
oriented, team approach to reduce cycle time. The team adopted a zero-based 
requirements philosophy, where any requirement that did not make sense was modified 
or deleted. An Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) was also established to maintain a 
continuous dialogue with industry. The Statement of Work (SOW) was limited to the 
requirements that could be satisfied by industry in the short time available. Many of the 
logistics, training, and testing deliverables were tailored to meet the unique requirements 
ofthe program or deleted entirely. As a result, the number of data items was reduced 
from 41 to 11 during development of the Procurement Data Package (PDP). [Ref 17: 
p.5] 
On 22 October 1993, DCSOPS validated the requirement for six satellite 
terminals capable of accessing both the military and commercial satellite constellations. 
The six satellite terminals would be fielded to the first PowerPAC3 company. The 
company was to be activated in June 1994, as the 269th Signal Company. On 7 January 
1994, DCSOPS released a formal memorandum validating the urgent requirement for the 
six terminals. By this time, the SPO was ready to release the RFP. 
Immediately following award of the contract the special project office was 
dissolved. PM SATCOM placed the program under Product Manager Tactical Satellite 
(PM TACSAT), LTC Mazzucchi, to monitor and manage the program as shown in Figure 
9. PM TACSAT relied on the SPO and the Project Leader, Paul Hancik, to oversee the 
program. A new Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) was selected to manage contract 
modifications. 
During this period the emphasis was on monitoring the terminals' production. 
The contractor's prototype, the TRI-SAT terminal, had to be reconfigured to meet the 
military's specific requirements. The specifications required the integration of several 
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new and/or upgraded NDI components that increased power requirements and weight. 
The cascading effect of each change tended to create numerous other problems that 
slowed the production of the terminals. Configuration management ·a.nd integration of 
the components became a much higher risk area than originally thought. 
CORE MATRIX 
MIL 4 2 PMSATCOM 
CIV 45 42 COV06Level 
Systems Engineering & Integration Division 1 Business Management Division 
I I I 
PMDSCS PMDSCS PM Universal PMTACSAT Florida Field Air Force 
Terminals Control Modem LTC/05 Level Office Liaison Office 
I I 
Program Technical Logistics 
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I I I I 
Project Project Project Project Leader Project Leader Project Project 
Leader Leader Leader STAR-T INMARSAT Leader Office 
AN/PSC-5 AN/PSC-7 AJCM ANffSC-85B ANffSC-93A LMST Tri-band 
ANffSC-93B ANffSC-1 OOA 
Figure 9. Satellite Communications Organizational Structure [Ref 26: p. 2-3] 
In June 1994, LTC Mazzucchi was promoted to the rank of Colonel and selected 
to be the PM for Military Strategic/Tactical Relay (MILSTAR). LTC Sidwell was made 
the acting Product Manager for PMO TACSAT until the centrally selected Product 
Manager, LTC Ludwig, arrived. While acting as Product Manager, LTC Sidwell 
evaluated the potential dollar value of future tri-band programs. With the support ofPEO 
COMM, the SPO formally requested that a new program office for tri-band procurements 
be created. The request for a dedicated tri-band program office was ultimately approved 
inApril1995. 
In December 1994, LTC Ludwig arrived and LTC Sidwell was selected to start up 
the Universal Modem Product Office. LTC Ludwig's basic branch was Artillery, and he 
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had very little experience with communications systems. This lack of communications 
background was offset by his acquisition experience and expertise in managing 
programs. Upon arriving, LTD Ludwig was briefed on the progress of the AN/TSC-143 
program and the impact of the integration, software, and reliability problems being 
experienced. 
During this time the USAISC Commander, Signal Center Commander, and 
DISC4 became heavily involved in the program's progress. The PowerPAC3 Company 
had been activated and missions in Haiti and Bosnia were developing. The USAISC 
Commander was applying pressure on PEO COMM to deliver the terminals. 
The terminals continued to experience technical problems through the end of 
1995. The original contract delivery schedule was slipped to May 1996. Thirteen 
modifications to the original contract, most of which granted schedule extensions, had 
been approved. In consideration for each contract modification that allowed a slip in the 
schedule, the Government received several terminal enhancements and other benefits 
such as additional training and extended warranties at no additional cost. 
LTC Beatty was centrally selected to be the Tri-band's first Product Manager. 
Upon his arrival in December 1995, he picked up responsibility for all tri-band type 
terminal programs in the military, to include responsibility for Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), Special Operations Forces (SOF), Joint Communications Support 
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Figure 10. Tri-band Program Office 
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By March 1996, the terminals had been completely retrofitted, and all major 
problems, except reliability, had been resolved. The terminals were sent to Fort 
Huachuca for operational testing and customer acceptance. On 15 May 1996, after 
completion of tests at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-nine Palms, 
California, the six terminals were conditionally accepted by the 269th Signal Company. 
D. BACKGROUND 
1. Requirements Generation 
a) Mission Need 
During DS/DS the Army Chief of Staff, General Vouno, recognized the 
need for liaison teams to be integrated into the U.S. component forces and coalition 
forces for command and control purposes. To do this General Vouno initiated a program 
called Project 5/Directed Telescope. 
Due to the success of the teams in providing command and control of the 
widely dispersed U.S. and multi-national forces, the liaison mission was adopted as part 
of Army doctrine. This doctrine led to the concept and ultimate development of the 
PowerPAC3 company. 
The Army's Signal Center began to look at lessons learned from DS/DS. 
One of the major lessons learned was that reliance on commercial systems was necessary 
due to the limited capacity of the DSCS. If an organization was not a high priority on the 
Pentagon's list of satellite users, it could not get access to a military satellite. Even if the 
organization was on the high priority list, the flexibility of military satellite system was 
limited by a bureaucratic process that required many levels of approval before getting 
access to the satellite. Commercial satellite systems could be accessed upon demand. 
The commercial satellite industry was thriving and could send up state-of-the-art 
satellites rather quickly and at reasonable cost. The cost of putting new defense satellites 
in orbit was prohibitive. [Ref 19: p. 15] 
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Considering the trend toward commercial satellite communications, the 
Signal Center began to develop requirements for integrating commercial satellite 
equipment into future military satellite terminals. The Signal Center's efforts to acquire 
funds for developing a prototype tri-band satellite terminal were restricted by the limited 
resources, changing threat, and uncertain mission of the armed forces during this period. 
Even though the Signal Center could not acquire the funds, commercial contractors could 
see the military's need for a tri-band terminal. Several contractors consulted the Signal 
Center and Battle Lab at Fort Gordon, Georgia, for a better understanding the Army's 
requirements. Some of these contractors began independent research and development 
(IR&D) of their own prototypes. 
b) Mission Validation 
In May 1992, General Gordon R. Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, 
organized the Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force (LAM TF) based on the original1941 
Louisiana Maneuvers concept. The purpose of the LAM TF was to experiment with new 
emerging technologies during real world exercises and evaluate how effective those 
technologies were in meeting doctrinal missions. [Ref 20] 
A portion of the LAM TF was devoted to the development of a 
Commercial Space Package (CSP) of which satellite communications were a major part. 
The LAM TF took the Army's PowerPAC3 concept developed during DS/DS and 
demonstrated the requirement for commercial satellite access. Following the 
recommendations of the LAM TF General Officer Working Group (GOWG), DCSOPS 
validated the doctrinal requirement for the PowerPAC3 company to have Tri-band 
capability. The company's mission would be to provide command and control 
communications (commercial and military) connectivity between the Army forces, multi-
national forces, and other service components by way of six liaison teams. The basis for 
the unit's mission profile was derived from multiple approved US Army TRADOC 
scenarios. The scenarios included Southwest Asia, Europe, Northeast Asia, and Latin 
America. Based on these scenarios, requirements were generated to ensure that the 
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AN/TSC-143 could operate in the expected environmental and tactical field conditions. 
[Ref. 22: p.5] 
2. Contracting 
a) Developing System Requirements 
Requirements generation was a two-part exercise that involved minimum 
essential performance requirements and RFP performance specifications. Several 
contractors were lobbying officials at the Department of the Army (DA) level to have 
their commercial tri-band terminals fill the Army's new requirement. Many of these 
manufactures had developed commercial satellite terminals for organizations such as the 
Cable News Network (CNN), National Security Agency (NSA), DIA, Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Army's Military Intelligence (MI) community. A 
short synopsis is provided to give the reader a better understanding of the events that led 
to the actual terminal performance requirements. 
DCSOPS tasked the AN/TSC-143 SPO and Army Signal Center to 
develop the minimum performance requirements on 22 October 1993. The requirements 
were based on the projected scenarios, in which these terminals would operate. The 
Signal Center, as previously stated, had already developed some requirements for a 
prototype tri-band terminal, now called the SHF Tri-band Advanced Range Extension 
Terminal (STAR-T). Due to time constraints, those minimum requirements were used as 
a baseline. The minimum requirements document was a two-page memorandum signed 
by the Signal Center Commander on 9 December 1993, and submitted to DCSOPS for 
inclusion in the procurement directive. 
The minimum essential requirements were created for DCSOPS to use in 
the memorandum validating the urgent requirement for these terminals. The 
requirements generated for the RFP were much more detailed and included several 
military specifications. The Signal Center was adamant about enforcing as many of the 
requirements and military specifications as possible. 
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On 4 January 1994, the Signal Center issued a message stating that the 
activation of the PowerP AC3 unit had been moved up to June 1994 due to a Post Cold 
War Command and Control Study. The study concerned command and control problems 
experienced during operations in DS/DS and Somalia. With the activation of the unit 
accelerated, the ANffSC-143 procurement was now considered urgent. DCSOPS 
validated the urgent requirement, but mandated that the acquisition be a "Best Value" 
competitive process rather than sole source. DCSOPS generated the formal tasking 
memorandum on 7 January 1994, formally validating the urgent requirement for six 
Prototype Tri-band Tactical Terminals (PT3). 
b) Source Selection 
Since DCSOPS required that the contract be awarded under conditions of 
full and open competition using a "Best Value" source selection, innovative techniques 
had to be implemented to reduce the normal time required for proposal evaluation, 
negotiation, and contract award. 
The SPO continued to focus on the schedule constraint. It was understood 
that the Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PAL T) had to be reduced considerably 
if the program was going to meet the schedule objective. The normal cycle time in 
CECOM for PAL T had been 234 days [Ref. 17: p. 1 ]. The SPO decided to focus on the 
short-term goal of shortening the PAL T by deleting, waiving, and hastening the normal 
process whenever and wherever he could. 
Due to the finite amount of time available, the SSA decided to limit the 
evaluation to key discriminators. Logistics support was not considered key to this 
program due to the short life expectancy and therefore was not evaluated. Instead, 
offerors were given a ceiling price for initial spares and maintenance support and 
required to submit a maintenance plan within 30 days of contract award. The past 
performance records of all potential offerors, program management abilities were 
considered acceptable, and therefore excluded from the evaluation. To further expedite 
the process, the project office began assessing performance risk before release of the 
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RFP. The project office used the EBB to request that all interested offerors submit the 
required information early. [Ref 17: p. 7] 
The program was first announced in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) 
on 10 November 1993. Foil owing the CBD announcement, a series of discussions and 
meetings between the project office and indust:Iy took place to clarify and modify 
requirements. In developing the RFP requirements, the Signal Center attempted to 
enforced numerous specifications beyond the minimum requirements they had generated 
earlier. Most of this "requirement creep" was stopped by support from PEO COMM and 
the CECOM Commander. 
The RFP was released on 12 January 1994, and by 11 February 1994, 
seven proposals had been received. To speed the evaluation process, the proposals were 
limited to 100 pages for technical factors, 25 pages for performance risk factors, and no 
limit on price factors. The SSP limited the amount of review by eliminating the SSAC 
and using only a SSEB to make recommendations to the SSA in determining the "Best 
Value" proposal. The source selection structure is shown in Figure 11. No SSAC was 
needed due to the level of experience of both the SSEB Chairperson and the SSA, and the 
schedule constraints. The SSP designated the Branch Chief SAT COM/ MILST AR 
Branch, a GS-14 position, to be the SSA. The SSP required the SSEB Chairperson to be 
a GM-15. [Ref 23: p.5] 
SSA 
Procurement 1+---t Legal Advisor .J---~---....... 
SSEB Chairman 
Performance Risk Technical Price 
Performance Integration Schedule SBSDBSP 
Figure 11. Source Selection Structure [Ref 24: p.9] 
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The factors evaluated were technical, price, and performance risk. The 
technical factor was considered more important than price and performance risk factors 
combined. The technical factor was significantly more important than price. The price 
factor was more important than the performance risk factor. 
Within the technical factor, the performance subfactor was equal in 
importance to the integration subfactor. The performance and integration subfactors 
combined were significantly more important than the schedule and small business 
subfactors combined, and the schedule subfactor was significantly more important then 
the small business subfactor. All offerors had to be rated as acceptable in each subfactor 
shown in Figure 12 to be eligible for award. 
• Technical 
• Performance 
+ Antenna Performance 
+ Data Quality 
+ Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) and Gain/Temperature 
(G/T) 
+ Reliability and Maintainability 
+ Powers Source and Power Consumption 
+ Switch and First Level Multiplexer 
• Integration 
+ Mechanical Design 
+ External Interfaces 





• Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business Subcontracting Plan 
(SBSDBSP) 
• Price 
• Performance Risk 
Figure 12. Factors, Subfactors, and elements of Evaluation Criteria [Ref. 24: p.5] 
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After narrowing the competitive range to four offerors, Items for 
Negotiations (IFNs) were discussed and BAFOs submitted and evaluated. A final 
recommendation was made to the SSA on 23 March 1994. 
c) Contract Award 
On 24 March 1994, a Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract for six prototype 
Tri-band SHF Tactical Satellite Terminals was awarded to GTE in the amount of 
$7,756,801. 
A debriefing was conducted on 12 April1994 to successful and 
unsuccessful offerors. At the debriefing, it was felt that the level of detail and data 
analysis provided in GTE's proposal greatly lowered the risk associated with each 
required subfactor. GTE's proposal provided a well thought-out and organized 
presentation of information, and when IFNs were required, responses were provided to 
proposal format. 
3. Engineering 
To develop the AN!fSC-143 terminal the prime contractor teamed with 
COMSAT RSi (RSi) to develop a prototype terminal called TRI-SAT. GTE had 
experience in switching equipment and systems integration while RSi had experience and 
a solid reputation as a reliable satellite communications equipment manufacturer. Only 
36 percent of the components were manufactured by GTE and RSi [Ref. 25: p. 98]. The 
other 64 percent came from ten other well-known vendors in the communications 
industry. 
The proposal data GTE submitted were based on the TRI-SAT capabilities that 
were similar, but not the same as the AN!fSC-143 required specifications. GTE was too 
optimistic in expressing its ability to manage what it thought would be simple 
modifications. The TRI-SAT terminal was a commercial tri-band prototype terminal 
GTE had developed independently and displayed to senior Army officials before award 
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of the ANffSC-143 contract. The terminal is similar in appearance to the ANffSC-143 
but did not meet many of the military specifications as stated in the RFP. 
Problems began to surface shortly after award of the contracf A post-award 
conference was held 12 April1994, to discuss concerns with variations between GTE's 
proposal and the RFP specifications. During the conference several issues were clarified 
and resolved, but one issue escalated. GTE representatives indicated that the terminals 
exceeded the specified weight by 700 pounds [Ref 26: p. 3]. The representatives 
expressed serious doubt in GTE's ability to overcome this problem within the schedule 
and funding constraints. On 19 Apri11994, three weeks after award, the first "cure" 
notice was sent to GTE threatening termination for default. John Marino, GTE Vice 
President for Army Tactical Communications Operations, responded to the cure notice 
with assurances that GTE would meet the weight specification. 
Two months later GTE began to experience significant integration and software 
problems. The requirement for interoperability with existing military satellite terminals 
and tactical switching systems was a much more complex task that required extensive 
modification and testing ofGTE's TRI-SAT terminal. 
In June 1994, GTE substituted its TRI-SAT terminal for scheduled testing rather 
than using the ANffSC-143 terminal. This was due to the extensive technical problems 
being experienced in integrating the ANffSC-143 components. Additionally, GTE 
wanted to see how well its commercial terminal performed under battlefield conditions 
during the Advance Warfighting Experiment (A WE). Fort Gordon's Test and Evaluation 
Coordination Office (TECO), a sub-office ofOPTEC, became heavily involved during 
the test that used military operators. This test showed that the system had substantial 
shortfalls in meeting the DSCS certification requirements, although it easily met all 
commercial satellite certification requirements. At this point it was suspected that GTE 
would have difficulty meeting DA' s required delivery date of 30 September 1994. 
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4. Testing 
Although these AN/TSC-143 terminals would mostly consistofNDI and COTS 
components, they were required to interface with existing tactical communications 
systems, DoD strategic systems, and commercial systems. As a result, there was an 
extensive need for interoperability and performance testing. However, it was obvious 
that time and money did not allow the test community to conduct business as usual. 
Four essential test events were established by the PM that had to be passed before 
final acceptance of the system by the gaining unit. They were the in-plant acceptance 
test (IP AT), the DSCS and Commercial Satellite Certification tests, a field installation 
acceptance test (FIAT), and an OPTEC sanctioned customer test. The TECO at Fort 
Gordon would plan and supervise the operational test during a field training exercise at 
Twenty-nine Palms, California, supported by military personnel from the gaining unit. 
The formal environmental, roadability, and airlift tests were deleted in place of the 
contractor providing an acceptable analysis to the PM that confirmed compliance. 
Interoperability testing and certification of the switching equipment would be conducted 
under the supervision of the me at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. [Ref. 17: p. 6] 
A summary of the events that transpired is given to emphasize the outside 
influences and test-fix-test nature of this accelerated procurement. The information was 
gathered through interviews with the project leader, Paul Hancik, and chief testing 
officer, Dennis Evanchik. 
The First Article Test (FAT) began early September 1994, four weeks before the 
required delivery. The test was halted by GTE before completion due to a series of 
critical technical failures. A second attempt at completing the FAT was made one week 
later. Although improvements were made, numerous failures caused GTE to halt the test 
again. GTE recognized that the terminals would not be ready by the required delivery 
date, and decided to negotiate a contract modification. The contract modification 
established a new delivery date of 15 November 1994 and increased the weight 
specification by 200 pounds. The modification was approved by the Government 
representatives in consideration of several enhancements to the terminals at no additional 
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cost. A third attempt to complete the FAT was conducted from 20 October through 16 
November 1994. Serious deficiencies continued to be experienced iti the terminals. 
A briefing was conducted for PEO COMM in November 1994 with PM 
SATCOM and GTE. The purpose of the meeting was to re-evaluate program progress, 
terminal status, and generate a new delivery schedule. USAISC was urging PEO COMM 
to deliver the terminals. The activation of the 269th Signal Company in June 1994 made 
the requirement for these terminals even more urgent. After receiving assurances from 
GTE that problems would be fixed and renegotiating the delivery plan, PEO COMM 
decided to send five of the terminals to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, with one stopping at 
Fort Monmouth to undergo DSCS certification from 18-21 November 1994. 
The DSCS certification was conduct by a DISA representative whose initial 
analysis of data suggested the terminal be certified. Additional analysis of the data had 
to be accomplished before certification was completed. Along with certification, DSCS 
performed a successful interoperability test between the ANffSC-143 and existing 
military satellite terminals. Upon completion of the tests the terminal was sent to Fort 
Huachuca to join the other four terminals. 
This terminal arrived at Fort Huachuca on 12 December 1994. A FIAT was 
conducted on the five terminals. Significant shortfalls in the performance of the 
terminals caused GTE to stop the test on 19 December 1994. A briefing was conducted 
for the USAISC Commander, Major General (MG) Leffler, to determine how to 
continue. MG Leffler stated, that although GTE was having difficulties, he felt GTE was 
still showing progress, and since the "glass was half full" he decided to press on with the 
fielding. Terminal delivery had been extended to March 1995. The GTE personnel at 
Fort Huachuca continued to modify, test, and fix problems with the terminals. New 
Equipment Training (NET) began 3 March 1995 after the equipment successfully passed 
a series of readiness tests that determined the terminals could be used for NET training. 
Following the training a final acceptance test was conducted and the results presented to 
the USAISC Commander. The results of the test indicated significant problems still 
existed with reliability, specification compliance, and other critical anomalies. At the 
close of the briefing PM SA TCOM proposed three options for terminal acceptance to the 
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USAISC Commander: ( 1) accept all five terminals; (2) accept three terminals; or (3) 
delay acceptance of all terminals. He recommended option three, delay acceptance, in 
order for GTE to further address reliability and operating temperature concerns. The 
USAISC Commander concurred with the PM's recommendation and directed GTE to 
conduct a temperature characterization test, improve reliability, and retrofit all terminals 
before any further testing would be considered. To facilitate the new guidance, GTE 
decided to ship two of the five terminals back to Taunton, Massachusetts, and a third one 
toRSi in Duluth, Georgia, to analyze reliability problems and begin retrofitting the 
terminals. One of the remaining two terminals at Fort Huachuca would be used to 
support temperature testing at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, while the 
other terminal was subject to shock and vibration analysis during a 20-mile road test 
On 5 May 1995, PM SATCOM received a program completion plan from GTE 
that identified all activities remaining on contract and a plan for final acceptance testing 
on 10 July 1995 with conditional acceptance on 20 July 1995. Due to the additional 
technical problems caused during the retrofit, testing was not conducted as GTE planned. 
A meeting was conducted in early September 1995 between PM SATCOM, 
DISA, and DSCS operations at Fort Monmouth to establish a downsized re-certification 
test since the initial test had resulted in excessive anomalies. During the second week of 
September 1995, the terminals successfully passed DSCS re-certification. 
On 6 September 1995, GTE gave another briefing to PM SATCOM addressing 
terminal progress and requesting numerous waivers from the original specifications in the 
RFP. During the briefing GTE stated that any "further effort on the terminals beyond 
implementation of the previous defined retrofits will have low payoffs." GTE had 
indicated the contract terms for acceptance of the terminals "as built," to be negotiated 
considering the request for waivers. Following this meeting, PM SATCOM prepared a 
test assessment for user reaction to the test data and potential work-around solutions. 
The waivers were approved, and GTE continued with its final retrofits. 
In January 1996, a final acceptance test was conducted on all six terminals in 
Taunton and all were conditionally accepted by PM SATCOM. The Government's 
formal acceptance form, DD250, was signed in consideration for a full-time GTE 
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representative on-site (Fort Huachuca) for one year after fielding. GTE was also required 
to complete retrofits on all terminals and ship all six terminals back to Fort Huachuca for 
the operational test and customer acceptance by April1996. 
a) Contract Modifications 
There were 13 contract modifications approved during this program. Two 
of them were strictly administrative while the rest were for schedule extensions and 
waivers of certain specifications. In consideration for the contract modifications, the 
Government received numerous enhancements to the terminals, additional training, a 
full-time GTE representative on-site, and a one-year extended warranty. The total cost to 
the Government was $9,521,108.94 for the program while the total cost of all six 
terminals was estimated at just under $20,000,000. The contractor, GTE, was willing to 
use its funds ($10 million overrun) in an attemptto gain the advantage ofbeing awarded 
the follow-on STAR-T contract. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The AN/TSC-143 acquisition illustrates the intricate environment surrounding 
communications systems procurement where last minute notifications, little written 
guidance, extensive outside organizational influences, and extremely challenging 
requirements are the norm. Developing an acquisition strategy to accommodate these 
factors is vital to the successful fielding of the equipment being procured. 
The informal notification process, which left the PM with little information on 
the mission or requirements of the terminals, provided only a "heads up" to the PEO and 
PM but no formal authorization to begin the procurement. 
The lack of any written guidance from DC SOPS forced the program office to 
guess at what the best solution would be. Without a validated MNS or ORD, the SPO 
had to conduct additional research to determine what the need was, and then conduct 
market research to determine what was available in the commercial market place. This 
additional work took time and effort that could have been better utilized. 
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Once written guidance from DCSOPS was received, the program's source 
selection progressed much faster. The use of terms like "urgent" and"prototype" 
allowed the procurement to bypass several acquisition processes. Most of the 
streamlining initiatives the SPOused focused on meeting the schedule objective rather 
than achieving the performance requirements. Waiving, deleting, and rushing through 
portions of the normal acquisition process early in the program increased the risk of 
achieving the technical requirements. The SSP had listed the technical subfactors of 
performance and integration as significantly more important than the schedule subfactor, 
but in reality schedule seemed to take priority. 
Involving the Army's Signal Center in developing the requirements tended to 
slow the acquisition process. The numerous requirements (military specifications) the 
Signal Center tried to enforce were not affordable nor realistically achievable within the 
schedule constraints. The acquisition reform that was taking place in the acquisition 
field had not been introduced to the Army Signal Center. The Signal Center's culture 
still clung to the old way of doing business, and it was not ready to streamline the process 
by reducing military specifications. 
Building and testing of the terminals exposed the technical difficulties that were 
to plague the program. The proposal submitted by the contractor assured the 
Government that the terminals would meet or exceed all performance requirements 
within the cost and schedule constraints. GTE had already built a prototype terminal 
capable of meeting commercial requirements, certifications, and specifications. The 
Government was confident in GTE's ability to deliver and did not question the data 
provided in the proposal. Additionally, no bid sampling was conducted before award due 
to the time constraints and the inflexibility ofthe testing community. 
The attempt to field the terminals to the PowerPAC3 company in September 1994 
was a waste of time. It was known that the terminals had significant technical shortfalls 
prior to shipping. The decision to ship the terminals was made as a result of high level 
pressure to deliver the terminals for real world missions in Haiti and Bosnia, and 
assurances from the contractor that the terminals would be fixed before fielding. The 
second attempt to field the terminals had similar problems as the first fielding, except the 
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Government had waived several specifications in an attempt to speed the delivery. The 
third fielding attempt was more successful, and the terminals were conditionally accepted 
by the 269th Signal Company. The Government received numerous enhancements to the 
terminals and maintenance support agreements in consideration for the numerous delays. 
PM SATCOM held the contractors to the FFP contract requirements as much as 
possible. The terminals came in under $9.9 million, but exceeded the schedule objective 
by 18 months. Performance requirements were significantly modified in order to deliver 
the terminals by April 1996. 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the acquisition history for the 




IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a discussion of the ANffSC-143's acquisition process 
focusing on the similarities and differences of the program as compared to the standard 
acquisition process. The areas to be discussed are the management environment, 
organizational influences, requirements generation, contracting, testing, and logistics 
support. Previous chapters have presented the historical facts behind acquisition reform, 
the current acquisition process, and the background of the ANffSC-143 acquisition. 
Many of these areas are complex and have interrelated issues. An analysis of why the 
ANffSC-143 acquisition was different will follow each area discussed. This will lead to 
a better understanding of how the ANffSC-143 program succeeded, but with some 
di~culty, in an environment oflimited resources and increasing public scrutiny. 
B. ENVIRONMENT 
1. Management Environment 
a) Similarities and Differences 
The acquisition environment has changed significantly since the ANffSC-
143 program was initiated. A change common to both communications and other types 
of acquisitions was massive downsizing. This downsizing triggered several 
organizational mergers and restructuring. 
There were a number of effects of the downsizing on the communications 
management environment. The downsizing mergers and restructuring seemed to have 
the effect of increasing the organization's size and responsibilities. The number of new 
communications programs continued to grow, and the levels in the decision making 
process increased. 
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The first difference is the merging ofPEO COMM with PEO Command 
and Control (C2), completed July 1995, which actually expanded the PEO's influence 
and organizational size. The PEO's position, now called Program :E'xecutive Office 
Command, Control, and Communications Systems (PEO C3S), was designated a two-star 
billet rather than the previous one-star billet. The merging ofPEOs increased the number 
of programs PEO C3S had responsibility for, while the downsizing of CECOM decreased 
the number of functional (matrix) support personnel available to manage individual 
programs. Shortly after the merger a complete restructuring of all PMOs under PEO C3S 
was planned to further consolidate the organization. PM MILST AR, PM GPS, and PM 
SATCOM were to merge into PM MILSATCOM. This was in reaction to the continued 
cuts in resources being mandated from senior leaders. 
The second difference was the growth in new ACAT III and IV 
communications programs. This normally required a special project office to be formed 
with a SPO and project leader to manage the initial requirement. The management team 
would work together to get the contract awarded. Once awarded the special project 
office would be disbanded. The program would then be managed by a project leader 
with a product manager overseeing all the projects under the product category. The 
Product Manager T ACSAT was responsible for all tactical satellite communications 
ground equipment, single and multi-channel. Once the request for a Tri-band Program 
Management Office was approved, the Product Manager Tri-band took over 
responsibility for all tri-band capable tactical satellite terminal programs. As a result of 
the increased number ofTri-band projects the project leaders typically had more than one 
project assigned. 
The third difference in management of this program from the normal 
acquisition process was the length of the decision making chain, which stretched at times 
from the Project Leader, Special Project Officer, Product Manager, Program Manager, to 
the PEO. This in combination with the turnover in the key managers slowed the decision 
making process considerably. Personnel in the chain were empowered to a certain 
extent, but the majority of decision making authority lay with the PM SATCOM, who 
had up to 20 other individual programs going at the same time. 
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b) Analysis 
To explain the increase in communications organization size and program 
growth we must look into the Army's senior leadership vision of the future. The growth 
in the communications requirements is a result of the CSA's Force XXI initiatives and 
vision of information warfare. Force XXI is the Army's overall vision for reshaping the 
land force through digitization, force modernization, and doctrinal changes, to 
accomplish its mission well into the 21st Century. Digitization brings the power of 
communications technology to the soldier allowing them to dominate the battlefield. 
The CSA's vision of information warfare permeates all branches of the Army with the 
need for using and managing real-time information to control the events shaping the 
battlefield. The CSA set up the LAM TF to evaluate "leap ahead" technologies during 
AWEs. These commercial state-of the-art technologies are being successfully tested 
during A WE battlefield exercises. The CSA vision combined with the LAM TF 
evaluations has increased pressure to integrate the technology into existing weapon 
systems or architectures quickly. This has led to a number of small communications 
programs being initiated that can quickly develop and field "leap ahead" systems using 
commercial-off-the-shelf components. The accelerated acquisition cycle is now fielding 
operational systems in two to five years from mission validation. Additionally, the useful 
life-span of military communications systems has been reduced to between five and ten 
years and continues to shrink. Currently commercial industry technology becomes 
obsolete in about 18 months. The military systems are expected to follow the same 
trend. The shrinking life-span creates the need to initiate new replacement programs as 
soon as the previous generation is fielded. This has significantly increased the number of 
programs managed under the PM. In the AN/TSC-143 case, five other Tri-band 
programs have been initiated since the fielding of the AN/TSC-143. The STAR-T, 
SOFTACS, AN/USC-60, LMST, and LST-8000 have all followed the AN/TSC-143. The 
STAR-T and SOFTACS are full developmental programs while the AN/USC-60, LMST, 
and LST-8000 are accelerated NDI type procurements. The STAR-T is the replacement 
terminal for the AN/TSC-143, while the other systems have a validated mission need that 
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required slightly different configuration and performance specifications, but all are tri-
band capable systems. 
In addressing the number of levels in the management of a 
communications system procurement, one must look at the increase in the number of 
new programs while the organizational structure remains the same or declines. PM 
SATCOM is responsible for a multitude of programs including all strategic and tactical, 
single and multi-channel, UHF, SHF, and EHF, ground satellite terminals in the Army as 
well as other Federal agencies and component Services. This is a massive responsibility 
that requires a large number of project leaders, project managers, and product managers 
to be placed under the PM. In addition, many of the requirements generated are 
considered "urgent," which increases the need for dedicated management. The AN/TSC-
143 program was managed, at times, three levels below the PM. The most important 
decisions were made at the PM and PEO levels while day to day operational decisions 
were at the Product Manager, SPO, and Project Leader level. The reason PM SATCOM 
must use this extended chain of decision making is due to the size, number, and urgency 
of new requirements that must be individually managed. Extending the decision making 
process to lower levels has had a negative impact on the management of small programs. 
The PM must rely on information from less trained and experienced individuals, and 
delegate more decision making responsibilities to those individuals. This increases the 
risk of problems occurring in these programs that could significantly delay the program 
and increase cost. 
One of the purposes of acquisition reform was to reduce the levels of 
management review programs must go through before a decision is made. This reduction 
in management reviews creates a much flatter organizational structure where decisions 
are made by the PM, PEO, and MDA. This keeps the decision making level down to a 
maximum of three levels, which is ideal for large programs, where the PM is only 
responsible for one program. As stated earlier, PM SATCOM has a multitude of 
responsibilities that encompass a wide variety of programs both large and small. As new 
requirements are validated and received by the PM, the PM must create new project 
offices using available resources. When the PM is assigned additional programs, he/she 
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must delegate the decision making responsibility to less trained and experienced 
individuals. This deepens the decision making levels and slows dowri the acquisition 
process. As a result, the PM tends to focus attention on the larger programs and provides 
minimal oversight and direction to each of the smaller programs. 
With this in mind, alternatives are suggested that may help reduce the risk 
to the programs under the PM by reducing the number of programs the PM must manage. 
One alternative is to enforce a cap on the number of programs a single PM can manage. 
This alternative would require more PM positions to be created, which in the current 
downsizing environment is less likely to occur. With the pressure to downsize the 
Acquisition Corps there is little chance the AAE could get authorization for more PM 
positions to lessen the number of programs under a single PM. Another alternative for 
PEO C3S programs is to separate the strategic and tactical type procurements. The 
strategic systems could be managed by either the USAISC systems command, or the 
CECOM material command. This would allow PM SATCOM and other PMs under PEO 
C3S to devote more time and attention to fewer projects that would lead to proactive 
decision making and problem solving. This alternative would, over the long run, 
decrease cost and increase likelihood of meeting program objectives by allowing the 
more experienced and well-trained PM to actually manage the program rather than just 
being responsible for it. 
2. Organizational Influences 
a) Similarities and Differences 
The organizational influences on communications procurement 
management are, in some ways, similar to the influences on the management of 
developmental procurements. Some of the organizations such as CECOM, a subordinate 
command of AMC; the Signal Center, a component ofTRADOC; and PMO SATCOM, 
which falls under PEO C3S are typical influences on any acquisition. Communications 
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program management is also similar to other acquisition agencies in that the PM office 
manages multiple programs. 
The difference between communications procurements and other 
procurements is the involvement of several unique organizations in the procurement of 
Army communications systems. Organizations such as DISC4, DISA,USAISC, and JCS 
(J6) have a significant role to play in the development and operational requirements of 
any new communications asset. Organizational relationships are shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Communications Systems Organizational Relationships 
The DISC4 has Army Staff responsibility and serves as the military deputy 
to the AAE for Army Information Mission Area (IMA) activities. These include 
establishing and approving policies, procedures, and standards for the planning, 
programming, life-cycle management, and use of the Army IMA resources. The DISC4 
oversees the activities ofPEOs managing command, control, communications and 
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computer information systems acquisition programs. In addition, DISC4 develops 
standards for data and interoperability of products, to include joint and combined 
programs, and administers the Army Spectrum Management Program. DISC4 was the 
directing authority for the AN/TSC-143 program. This organization monitored the 
AN/TSC-143 program to ensure that interoperability requirements and other standards 
were incorporated into the system so that it would be part of the IMA. [Ref. 14] 
DISA, under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C31)), conducts requirements assessment for 
compatibility, interoperability, integration, and adherence to communications standards. 
The Joint Interoperability Test Center (JITC), a part ofDISA, is tasked with certifying 
communications equipment from all services. DISA was heavily involved in certifying 
the AN/TSC-143 switch before contract award, and the DSCS certification prior to the 
customer acceptance test. [Ref. 14] 
USAISC, a major U.S. Army Command, is responsible to the geographical 
CINCs, DCSOPS, and JCS (J6) for executing directed communications missions in 
various theaters of operation. Units under its command operate and maintain the 
communications equipment on the battlefield. USAISC did not become heavily involved 
in the AN/TSC-143 program until the initial attempt to field the terminals during 
September 1994. As the user of the terminals, USAISC was very concerned about the 
terminals operational capabilities and refused to accept them until the minimum 
performance specifications were met. Its primary focus before September 1994 was on 
activating the PowerPAC3 company and getting the personnel and equipment ready to 
perform its mission. 
Not depicted in Figure 13 are the relationships that exist at the two and 
three star level between the Signal Center, CECOM, DISC4, DISA, USAISC, and JCS 
(J6) commanders and directors. Additionally, the ASD (C31), Emmett Paige Jr., is also a 
significant influence as he was the commander ofboth the 11th Signal Brigade (the 
PowerP AC3' s higher headquarters) and USAISC during his military service. Many of 
these senior leaders have known each other for years and have watched the evolution of 
the Defense Department's communications architecture. They all have come from 
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communications backgrounds and have seen both the strategic and tactical needs of the 
warfighter. 
b) Analysis 
The number of high-level organizations that influence the procurement of 
all communications systems is a unique characteristic of the communications 
environment. To manage and control DoD's massive information architecture properly, 
all requirements related to command, control, and communications are filtered through 
these dedicated organizations to ensure these systems meet DoD, Federal, and 
international requirements as well as the warfighter' s needs. The limited frequency 
spectrum combined with international and domestic laws, policies, and regulations 
providing guidance of the use of those frequencies and power outputs makes the proper 
management of communications standards vital. 
Every military unit and weapon system program are a potential customer 
ofPEO C3S since information is required to be transmitted and received throughout the 
battlefield at all times. The way in which the warfighter receives their information must 
be transparent. -The warfighter has little time to concern themselves with 
communications architecture, interoperability, frequency, and access power problems. 
The strategic and tactical networks must merge to a single seamless standard so that the 
warfighter can take out their cellular phone on the battlefield and call anywhere in the 
world. Additionally, they must be able to receive and transmit a variety of incoming 
information (video, graphical, text, and voice to name a few) without the worry of 
ensuring interoperability of the various systems. The numerous stovepipe systems that 
were fielded in the past have to be modified or replaced so that one massive, yet 
manageable, interoperable system that incorporates the communications policies of both 
the U.S. and foreign Governments. This massive undertaking requires the organizational 
structure currently in place to manage the overwhelming DoD communications and 
information needs. 
The tremendous influence of the Signal Community (ASD(C3I), DISA, 
JCS(J6), DISC4, USAISC, CECOM, and Signal Center) when supporting a 
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communications procurement has allowed smaller programs such as the AN!fSC-143 to 
flow through the requirements generation process easily. 
C. ACQUISITION PROCESS 
1. Requirements Generations 
a) Similarities and Differences 
The requirements generation process of the AN!fSC-143 program was 
quite different from what would be considered normal in the acquisition environment. 
The differences included the MAA process, the notification, the constraints, and the lack 
of a MNS or ORD. A further difference concerns the urgency of need and the 
designation of this terminal as a prototype. 
The first difference was how the MAA was conducted. The Signal Center 
generated the requirement for PowerPAC3 to have tri-band capability, although it had to 
sell the need to the LAM TF GOWG. The Signal Center, with the support of the DISC4 
and USAISC Commander, successfully worked with the LAM TF GOWG to prove the 
need for tri-band capability. 
The second difference was that the LAM TF GOWG acted directly under 
the CSA's authority as represented by DCSOPS. Once the LAM TF evaluated the need 
and approved a particular requirement to meet that need, it would orally notify DC SOPS 
for immediate validation. DC SOPS would get the CSA's oral approval, reprogram funds 
for the procurement, and then orally notify the procurement agency, DISC4 all the way 
down to the SPO level. This allowed the normal requirements generation process to be 
accelerated, with DCSOPS making it a DA directed procurement. 
The third difference was the information provided by DCSOPS in the 
verbal directive that placed a number of mandates normally decided by the PM and/or 
PCO. These mandates greatly influenced the program's acquisition process. They were: 
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• Utilize a NDI and COTS based acquisition process 
• Limit acquisition to a fixed quantity of six terminals 
• Operational requirement date of30 September 1994 
• Budget ceiling of$9.9 million in OPA FY94 reprogrammed funds 
• Use "Best Value" competition for source selection [Ref 30] 
No MNS or ORD was ever generated for the terminal. Instead, a list of 
minimum essential requirements was incorporated into the formal validation and 
directive document dated 7 January 1994, and provided to the SPOon 13 January 1994. 
This was over two months after the CBD solicitation notice, and well after the initial oral 
notification. 
The urgency of this requirement increased with the on-going real world 
operations in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. As a result, DCSOPS stated in the formal 
validation and directive document that this was an "urgent requirement" and that it was 
considered a "Prototype Super High Frequency (SHF) Tri-band Satellite Terminal For the 
Power Projection Command, Control, and Communications (PowerPAC3) Company." 
Both the urgency of need and prototype designation make this quite different from the 
normal requirements generation. 
b) Analysis 
Why was the requirement generation different? The need for Tri-band 
capability was based on the PowerPAC3 company mission. The PowerP AC3 company 
mission was still being developed and the company would not exist until July 1994. 
USAISC was tasked to build a modified table of equipment (MTOE) for the PowerP AC3 
company based on the doctrinal concept the LAM TF GOWG had approved. The Signal 
Center knew that whatever the mission would be it would require tri-band capability. 
The PowerP AC3 requirement for tri-band capability was evaluated and approved by the 
LAM TF GOWG and DCSOPS with the persistence of the Signal Center. The AN/TSC-
143 terminal performance requirements were to fit the mission profile of the PowerPAC3 
company. This was a lesser objective of the Signal Center, which had actually 
championed the tri-band capability. The key role of the Signal Center, as a CBTDEV 
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and user representative, allowed it to influence the mission need and finesse the 
requirements generation process to meet its own strategic objectives. The Signal 
Center's strategic objective was to modernize and expand the existing military satellite 
capability with state-of-the art ground terminals capable of accessing commercial 
satellites. The Signal Center, with the support of the Signal Community, aggressively 
pursued its objectives and searched out opportunities for achieving success. 
Another unique characteristic in the requirements generation process was 
the verbal notification of the requirement directly to PM SAT COM by the validating and 
approving organization, DCSOPS. This was done for several reasons. First, the small 
size of the acquisition required no formal reviews or approvals. Second, the lobbying 
efforts of the contractors and Signal Center set the tone for how quickly this could be 
done. Third, the Army's need to prove that acquisitions could be achieved well under the 
eight to 16 year norm. Fourth, the expected activation date of the PowerPAC3 company 
moved from FY96 to June 1994. 
The verbal guidance specifically limited the procurement to six tri-band 
capable terminals to be fielded within one year at a cost under $9.9 million using a 
NDI/COTS approach. The cost constraint from DCSOPS was primarily based on the 
lobbying efforts of several contractors who had assured Army leadership that they could 
provide the terminals within that figure. Keeping the cost below the $10 million 
threshold allowed the funds to be reprogrammed without notifying Congress and allowed 
for further streamlining of the acquisition process. The fixed quantity of six terminals 
was in line with the PowerP AC3 liaison mission that consisted of six teams. The lobbyist 
had assured the leadership it could provide the six terminals within six to eight months of 
contract award [Ref 21]. The schedule was viewed by the PM and SPO as the most 
difficult challenge. Even ifDCSOPS had not mandated a NDI/COTS strategy the 
schedule constraint would have. The schedule was mandated because of the Post Cold 
War Study that moved the activation date of the PowerPAC3 company up to June 1994 
[Ref 27]. This was due to the potential increase in operations throughout the world. The 
study cited command and control issues in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and predicted 
the same issues would occur in Bosnia if the U.S. were to become involved. The primary 
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concern was that command and control communications were still limited in mobility 
and capacity. Industry's assurances that a six to eight month delivery schedule was 
achievable led DCSOPS, considering the June activation date, to mandate a required 
delivery date of30 September 1994. This gave the SPO a goal of 120 days for contract 
award. The schedule anticipated for this procurement is depicted in Figure 14. 
Projected Schedule of AN!TSC-143 Prototype Program 10-13 months 
I 4 months None None 6-8 months 
so MSI MSIT MSIII I Deploy I 
Phase 0 Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Concept Program Engineering & Production, Fielding/ 
Exploration Definition & Manufacturing Deployment, & 
Risk Reduction Development Operational Support 
so ~ jMSI I I MSII I I MS mj I Deploy I 
I 1 year None 1-2 years 1-2 years 
Average NDI Acquisition Process 3-5 years 
Figure 14. Comparison of Standard and NDI Acquisition Process After Ref. [13: p. 2] 
The reasons no MNS, ORD, or other formally written document had been 
generated were a combination of the urgency of need and lack of technical knowledge 
needed to generate the minimum specifications within the office of the DCSOPS. The 
SPO was required to work with the Signal Center immediately just to begin to understand 
the actual requirements. With the on-going real world missions in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, 
and the potential for Bosnia, the requirement became urgent. This prompted a lot more 
verbal notifications and actions to be initiated before a validated requirement being 
formally generated. The verbal notifications did originate from the proper authority 
(DCSOPS) and it was, therefore, appropriate to take action. 
The urgency of need arose from the Post Cold War Command and Control 
study that indicated an immediate need for the PowerP AC3 company. The study brought 
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out the fact that command and control communications access continued to be a problem 
in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. The potential for further involvement in the Bosnia crisis 
along with the continuing North Korean and Iraqi threats escalated the need for these 
terminals to be delivered to the PowerPAC3 company. This upgraded the requirement 
from a normal NDI process to an urgent NDI process. According to Army officials at the 
DCSOPS, Signal Center, and DISC4, the AN/TSC-143 was urgently needed. Failure to 
provide these terminals by 30 September 1994 would "seriously degrade the Army's 
capability to support joint and combined operations"[Ref 28]. Until the need was met, 
Army officials believed less cost-effective and less-capable alternatives would have to be 
used. This would result in less capable command and control of forces on the ground and 
potentially higher attrition rates of Army assets. 
The SPO attempted to streamline the acquisition process further by asking 
for approval of a Justification and Approval (J&A) letter by DCSOPS to limit 
competition due to the urgency of need. DC SOPS' response to the PCO was to use full 
and open competition to get the "Best Value." Additionally, there had been extensive 
contact between certain contractors and the Government organizations involved with this 
acquisition that could have been perceived as less than an arm's length relationship. 
Concerns over the possibility of protests under the Procurement Integrity Act mandated 
that the source selection use full and open competition in order to get the "Best Value." 
The term "urgent" was used to instill a sense of priority into those working directly on 
the program. 
Further analysis of the urgency of need indicates that other assets were 
available that could access commercial satellite bands. While no other satellite terminal 
in DoD's inventory provides all the capabilities planned for the AN/TSC-143, several 
systems in the inventory or that were commercially available offered significant 
capability. For example, the AN/TSC-85B and AN/TSC-93B provide access to the 
military satellite band while the TROJAN SPIRIT provides the commercial band access. 
The TROJAN SPIRIT was a classified Military Intelligence initiative (now unclassified) 
which could be considered a precursor to the AN/TSC-143 effort, but was limited to a 
single commercial satellite band. Additionally, the lease of commercial mobile satellite 
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ground terminals from ALASCOM and various other vendors can provide commercial 
access. Accordingly, the Army may have had more time, if necessary, to develop and test 
the ANtfSC-143 without excessive schedule pressure. The risk of integrating state-of-
the-art technologies with existing systems poses significant obstacles that may take time 
to overcome. With the alternatives currently available to fill the tri-band capability the 
AN!TSC-143 program should not have been considered urgent. 
The term prototype was one of the first indications that this program was 
high risk. Prototype suggests that this terminal is a research and development effort. It 
also alludes to the fact that this terminal had never been manufactured, tested, or certified 
as a commercially available system. As mentioned in previous chapters, industry had 
developed its own prototypes in anticipation of the evolving military satellite capacity 
constraints, but there were no existing tri-band terminals in the military or commercial 
inventories that had been tested and certified as fully operational. There had been some 
classified programs that had used the commercial frequency bands, but they were not 
similar to the AN!TSC-143 configuration or performance requirements. 
The term prototype was used because no operationally proven tri-band 
system existed in either the commercial or military inventories. The term prototype 
combined with the limited procurement of six terminals allowed the program to avoid 
type classification and further streamlined the normal acquisition process. 
2. Contracting 
a) Similarities and Differences 
There were numerous similarities between the standard and AN!TSC-143 
contracting processes. The performance requirements were developed under the team 
concept, but enforced by the CBTDEV who actually had final approval. A FFP type 
contract was decided to best fit this procurement by the PCO based on the information 
that was provided. The program was solicited using the CBD, and a formal RFP was put 
together and sent out to potential offerors. Proposals were received from offerors and 
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evaluated. Discussions were held with those offerors determined to be in the competitive 
range. A BAFO was presented to the SSEB followed by a recommendation to the SSA. 
The contract was awarded, and debriefings were held with offerors upon request. This 
contracting process resulted in no protests filed. 
Even though there were numerous similarities, there were still a few 
differences between the two contracting processes. Some of the differences were, the 
lack of an acquisition plan, the mandated "Best Value" source selection, thoroughness of 
market research, choice of contract type, the approval authority and timing of the SSP, 
the structure of the review process, and the time it took to award the contract. 
Additionally, the lack of bid sampling for a prototype procurement was unusual. While 
the development of performance requirements was similar to the normal process, the 
designation of those requirements as thresholds or objectives was unclear. 
The first difference was the lack of a formal acquisition plan. The 
acquisition plan, as stated in FAR 7.101, coordinates and integrates the efforts of all 
personnel responsible for an acquisition. Informal planning in the past had led to 
situations where the PCO had inadequate time to conduct the procurement effectively. 
An acquisition plan is required by the FAR for all acquisitions. 
The second difference concerned the mandate for a competitive "Best 
Value" process, even though DCSOPs had validated and approved this program as an 
urgent requirement. Normally the contracting officer determines the best approach to 
take given the type of procurement and specific schedule and cost constraints. 
The third difference was in the conducting of market research. Market 
research is normally divided into market surveillance and market investigation. As stated 
in AR 70-3, the objective of market surveillance is to gather sufficient data to identify 
technical capabilities and industrial capacity to meet potential user-identified 
requirements. This provides a general sense of products available in the market, as well 
as their characteristics and capabilities. Market investigation, on the other hand, is 
conducted to gather sufficient data in direct response to the user's need as identified in 
the MNS that should form the basis for developing the acquisition strategy for a 
particular requirement. The market investigation also provides the basis for determining 
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whether to procure competitively or from a sole source, how logistics support should be 
provided, and what additional testing should be done. The market research for the 
AN/TSC-143 program was limited to what the industry had provided during the AFCEA 
and AUSA conventions. The prototypes were displayed and their expected capabilities 
heavily promoted without testing or certification by an independent organization. At the 
urging of the Signal Center, the Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Gordon, Georgia, 
(BCBL(G)) had conducted some limited surveillance of the market place, but nothing 
that could be considered market investigation. The BCBL(G) determined the technology 
required was well developed and reliable. This was based on several untested prototypes 
that industry had already developed. None of the prototypes had been tested and most of 
the data from industry were based on tests of individual components and not on an 
integrated system. The SSEB technical personnel relied on the integrity of the data 
contained in the offerors' proposals to make a determination of the "Best Value" 
proposal. The data were never independently verified to ensure their validity. 
The fourth difference concerned the selection of contract type. In 
pursuing a high risk acquisition, the Government wants to share the risk with the 
contractor and provide an incentive for the contractor to overcome any obstacles faced 
during the procurement. A FFP contract is normally used for products that are already 
established and costs are known. There is little risk to the contractor, so it is willing to 
set a FFP for the program. When the product has never been produced or tested before, 
several other contract types may provide better incentives for a contractor to perform at 
its best. The integrity of the FFP type contract requires the contractor to deliver the 
system on time, at cost, and to performance standards. Some of the contractors in 
industry were eager to get into the multi-channel satellite communications market as it is 
one of the few growing markets in DoD. GTE, in particular, saw this as an opportunity 
to become the sole source provider of all the Army's multi-channel communications 
equipment. GTE was already fielding the MSE system to the Army's division level units 
and had previously fielded the TRIT AC switching system for Echelons Above Corps 
units. To reduce the Governments perceived risk, the contractor assured the Government 
that the necessary modifications to its prototype would be easily achieved. 
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The fifth difference was that the SSP was approved by the SSA on 6 
January 1994, one day before the formal validation of the urgent Tri-band requirement 
was approved, and two months after the formal solicitation was placed in CBD. 
The sixth difference was that the SSA was designated as the Branch Chief 
SATCOMIMILSTAR Branch (a GS-14 position) in the SSP while SSEB Chairperson was 
designated, by rank, as a GM-15. Although the SSP had not designated the SSA by rank, 
it did place a senior ranking person in the position of reporting to a junior ranking person. 
The seventh difference was in the structure of the source selection 
organization. As stated in Chapter II, the organization normally consists of a SSA, 
SSAC, and a SSEB. The fact that no SSAC was used in the source selection process was 
quite different from the normal process. The SSAC normally consists of senior personnel 
who have a significant amount of acquisition experience. The SSEB evaluates each of 
the factors listed in the RFP and provides those findings to the SSAC. The SSAC 
compares the findings for each proposal to the findings of the other proposals to 
determine the overall "Best Value." The SSAC then presents the "Best Value" 
recommendation to the SSA. 
The eighth difference in the contracting process, and the one that stands 
out the most, is the amount of time it took to award the contract. The normal PAL T for 
CECOM was 234 days, the SPO's goal was 120 days, and the program actually 
completed the PALT in 72 days. To accomplish this, the SPO put together a team of 
dedicated experts from all the functional areas (procuring, designing, engineering, 
testing, and contracting). This team concept is now known as an Integrated Product 
Team (IPT) and is considered a standard practice that grew out of the acquisition reform 
process. A series of tailoring processes such as use of an EBB, reducing the Contract 
Data Requirements List (CDRL), and limiting the SOW to only what was essential were 
used to speed the contracting process. The EBB was used extensively to clarify to all 
offerors any questions or comments that had been presented. A voiding the postal or any 
other delivery system saved valuable time and money in distributing up-to-the-minute 
information. 
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The ninth difference was the fact that no bid sampling was conducted 
before award of this procurement contract for "prototype" terminals. The term prototype 
as discussed earlier refers to a developmental program. This was a procurement that 
required delivery of a fully operational system within a year of notification of the 
requirement. Not conducting bid sampling placed a significant amount of trust in the 
unverified data analysis contained in the contractors' proposals. 
The final difference was in defining the threshold and objective 
performance specifications the terminal would be required to meet. The AN/TSC-143 
program was a prototype system that would be the foundation of all tri-band terminals to 
follow. The mission of the PowerPAC3 company was unique and therefore the AN/TSC-
143 should have been designed specifically to satisfy those unique requirements. 
b) Analysis 
The reasons for the differences in the AN/TSC-143 contracting process 
were primarily generated fro~ the constraints DCSOPS placed on the PM. The schedule 
constraint of one year drove the entire contracting process while the other constraints 
such as NDIICOTS, "Best Value" competition, and $9.9 million ceiling defined the 
boundaries. In addition, a combination of factors such as a one-time buy, urgency of 
need, and the small dollar value of the procurement allowed for an informal contracting 
process that reduced the amount of time needed to award the contract. 
Forgoing the acquisition plan in this program was seen as appropriate due 
to the dollar size and short duration of the program. Additionally, the one-time buy 
allowed for an informal planning process. FAR 7.103 allows the head of an agency to 
waive detail and formality requirements, as necessary, for planning acquisitions having 
compressed delivery or performance schedules because of the urgency of the need. As 
stated in DF ARS 207.103, no written acquisition plan is required for one-time 
procurements or procurements costing under $15 million in a single year. The contractor 
developed its own acquisition plan that was included as part of the submitted proposaL 
The acquisition plan was updated as the contractor saw fit throughout the acquisition 
process. 
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The mandate for a "Best Value" competition from DCSOPS was due to 
concerns over the Procurement Integrity Act. Certain contractors in the industry had 
been working extensively with the signal community on the future communications 
needs of the Army. In particular, was the Signal Centers involvement with several 
contractors during the push for tri-band capability to resolve the limited DSCS capacity 
problems experienced during DS/DS. This may have led to the perception of a less than 
arm's length relationship between certain contractors and organizations involved in the 
procurement. Additionally, DCSOPS had also been lobbied by those same contractors 
and based most of its constraints on the information it had received from those particular 
contractors. 
Market research was inadequate for several reasons. First, the actual 
performance requirements had not been fully determined when the NDI acquisition 
strategy was mandated by DCSOPS. The senior leadership had been successfully lobbied 
by industry into thinking that the tri-band capable terminals were already fully developed 
and met or were close to meeting the necessary DSCS certification and military testing 
requirements. Furthermore, the SPO had little time to examine the market and 
independently verify the industries true capabilities. The Signal Center supported 
industry's assurances that the AN!TSC-143 terminals could be fielded within the 
DCSOPS mandated constraints. 
An analysis of the selection of a FFP type contract for this procurement is 
necessary to determine why it was selected and if any other alternatives may have better 
incentives for contractor to perform. The FFP selection was based on the perceived risks 
in meeting the schedule constraint not in achieving the technical performance 
requirements. The PCO made the decision based on information from technical 
personnel on the acquisition team as well as face-to-face meetings with industry. 
Industry had repeatedly assured the Government that it could easily produce the terminals 
and, in fact, had already developed several prototype terminals using its own IR&D 
funds. 
FAR 12.207 limits the use of contract types allowed for procurement of 
commercial items. The FAR states that "agencies shall use firm-fixed-price contracts or 
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fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment for the acquisition of commercial 
items. Use of any other contract type to acquire commercial items is prohibited." This 
severely limited the PCO's options. 
The SSP was not approved until two months after the solicitation 
announcement on the CBD. This was due to lack of information on performance 
requirements and knowledge on what the evaluation criteria should be. The acquisition 
team knew the minimum AN/TSC-143 requirements and, since this was an urgent 
procurement, decided to place the solicitation on the CBD and work with industry to help 
create the performance requirements. Most of the initial work on the program was 
strictly verbal, which was followed-up in writing at a later date. It took several months 
for the team (including industry) to develop and agree upon the performance 
requirements and evaluation factors that would achieve a "Best Value" selection. 
The SSA was designated as the Branch ChiefSATCOMIMILSTAR 
because the program was not considered a "major system" as defined under DoDD 
5000.1. The SSEB Chairperson was senior to the SSA for reasons unrelated to the source 
selection process. However, since the individual selected was highly qualified and 
willing to participate as the SSEB Chairperson he was designated as such in the SSP. 
The SSAC was seen as an unnecessary level of review considering the 
experience level of the SSA and SSEB chairperson and schedule constraint. The low 
dollar value and urgency of need for this program allowed an informal organizational 
structure to be used. The informal procedures were recognized by the Comptroller 
General, who had offered little guidance. Thus, there was no general legal requirement 
for a SSAC. 
The speed in which the contract was awarded can be attributed to the 
efforts of both the CECOM Acquisition Center and the SPO. The Acquisition Center 
recommended that the acquisition team use a package of experimental streamlining 
initiatives, known as PACER, to help meet the program objectives. Although these 
initiatives assisted the team in awarding the contract in a record 72 days, the success was 
primarily attributed to the high level of interaction and openness of all parties involved. 
The SPO had brought in all parties (Government and Industry) and made them a part of 
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the decision process. Industry had substantial input to the RFP that helped speed the 
submission of their proposals. This involvement was occurring back in late 1993, early 
1994 time-frame and makes it different from the standard contracting process. 
Another area that deserves further analysis is the use, or lack of use, of bid 
samples. The FAR imposes no restrictions on the use ofbid samples in negotiated 
procurements, but testing and inspection of the samples are limited by 41 U.S. C. 253c 
and 10 U.S. C. 2319 to qualification requirements. When asked why no bid sampling was 
conducted, the indications from the PMO were that it was not feasible due to the 
schedule constraints. The winning contractor would have only six months to get the 
terminals produced, tested, and accepted by the gaining unit if the 120 day contract 
award goal was achieved. The PMO personnel also stated that not all potential offerors 
had a prototype system. The concern over full and open competition to all potential 
offerors, even those who did not have a prototype, influenced the decision not to conduct 
bid sampling. With the imposed time constraint it would have seemed logical to exclude 
those offerors who had never attempted to build this product before. The competitive 
range should have been limited to those offerors who had built prototypes. A 
requirement should have been included in the RFP for contractors to submit their 
prototypes for testing. This would have determined which offeror stood the best chance 
of meeting the performance requirements within the allotted time. 
Another area requiring analysis is the development and enforcement of 
performance specifications. In attempting to allow the contractor flexibility in meeting 
performance requirements, the SPO tried to avoid calling out military specifications 
whenever possible. Problems with the TRADOC culture wanting to enforce the military 
specifications tended to slow the process as tradeoffs between cost schedule and 
performance were controlled by agencies not under the PM' s control. Analysis of the 
performance requirements development is needed to determine why the Signal Center 
was adamant about keeping military specifications. After the need for these terminals 
was validated, the Signal Center, as the user representative, then generated the 
requirements the terminals would meet based on the STAR-T requirements rather than 
the PowerPAC3 requirements. The scenarios in which the PowerPAC3 company would 
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participate, had the company's assets deployed primarily to Major Headquarters (division 
and above) in four specific geographical areas ranging from tropical to desert conditions. 
Some requirements for the STAR-T such as rapid setup and tear-doWn, temperature 
range down to -40 degrees Fahrenheit, and switching capability were probably not critical 
for the AN!fSC-143 mission requirement. Some of the STAR-T terminals may be 
deployed to colder regions such as Alaska, Norway, Sweden, ·etc., which require 
operation in temperatures as low as -40 degrees. Some of the stringent requirements 
were probably unnecessarily enforced on the AN!fSC-143 program considering where 
these terminals would be deployed. 
The number of waivers approved for the AN!fSC-143 program in 
December 1995 indicated the requirements exceeded what was actually acceptable 
(threshold). The requirements that were modified are presented in Figure 15. 
Original Spec Modified Spec As Accepted 
Reliability MTBF> 1 OOOhrs MTBF>400hrs MTBF-150hrs 
Weight <4600lbs <4750lbs -4725lbs 
Non-opTemp -40 to+ 160 -24 to+ 160 -24 to +160 
Operating Temp -24 to +120 -24 to+ 110 -24 to+ 110 
Set-up Time <30 minutes <2.5 hours <2.5 hours 
Figure 15. Specification Waivers [Ref 29: p. 12] 
In areas like reliability, further market investigation would have shown 
that no satellite terminal had ever come near achieving the 1,000-hour requirement as 
shown in Figure 16. The reliability factor was based on the MSE tactical switching 
systems reliability requirement rather than market research of the current satellite market. 
MSE switching systems had extensive research, development, and testing conducted 
under a foreign government before the U.S. military acquired the system. Given the tight 
schedule, cost constraints, and scenarios in which these terminals would operate, the 
Signal Center should not have been so adamant about enforcing all the specifications on 
the AN!fSC-143. The three satellite terminals presented in Figure 16 were deployable to 
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environments world-wide while the AN!TSC-143 had a limited geographical area to 
support. 
Terminal AN!TSC-143 AN!TSC-85/93 LMST SPIRIT II 
MTBF (Spec/ Actual) 1000/150 8511375 744/TBD 1000/500 
Storage Temp -24 to 160 -70 to 160 -25.6 to 149 -76to 158 
Operating Temp -24 to 110 -25 to 125 -4 to 122 -25.6 to 125.6 
Notes: Switch No Switch No Switch No Switch 
SHF SHF SHF SHF 
Tri-band Single-band Tri-band Tri-band 
HHMMWV 5 Ton truck No Vehicle HMMWV 
No Trailer Trailer Trailer Trailer 
Figure 16. Comparison of Specifications from Similar Systems [Ref. 29: p.19] 
More education and emphasis from the senior military leadership on 
acquisition reform may have prevented the Signal Center from sticking to MILSPEC 
requirements so adamantly. An actual cultural change must take place to shift the mind-
set of relying on a single predetermined process to meet all our needs, to a new mind-set 
that accepts change and adapts to the environmental challenges. In the end, this 
inflexibility was probably the most time consuming problem the SPO had to manage. 
As seen from the PM' s perspective the unwillingness to bend the 
requirements made the acquisition virtually impossible. To take a complex prototype 
system that had never been produced or tested before, and attempt to field it fully 
operational to a tactical unit in less than a year was unrealistic. One way this program 
could have realistically met all the imposed objectives was to accept one of the 
prototypes the contractors had built but not tested "as is." This would have allowed the 
winning contractor to finish testing the prototype to ensure it met the requirements it was 
designed to meet, and then build six more terminals for the PowerP AC3 company within 
the six to eight month period. 
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3. Systems Testing 
a) Similarities and Differences 
The similarity between the ANffSC-143 testing process and the normal 
testing process was limited to the involvement of OP1EC during the customer 
acceptance testing and the creation of the TIWG to decide what and how the tests would 
be conducted. Other tests such as the FAT were conducted which alludes to 
developmental testing, but were in actuality considered a progress check before shipping 
the terminals. 
The differences started with no developmental testing or analysis being 
conducted on this prototype concept. Two other differences were the abbreviated test 
plan and the monitoring of the tests. In the ANffSC-143 case, the tests were monitored 
and managed by technical representatives from CECOM rather than 1ECOM, AMSAA, 
or OP1EC. The final difference was the requirement for certification of the switch, the 
military satellite equipment, and the commercial satellite equipment from organizations 
outside the normal testing community. 
The first difference was the lack of developmental testing. The mandate 
from DCSOPS was for a NDI product. This indicated the product was already developed 
and commercially available. DCSOPS assumed that there may be some modifications 
required, but based on the prototypes displayed, the advertised performance capabilities, 
and the contractors' assurances mandated the NDI strategy. The SPO had to manage the 
program with the constraints dictated by the requesting organization. 
The second difference was the abbreviated test plan. A formal Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan (1EMP) was never created. In a normal acquisition, the 1EMP 
describes the program's overall test and evaluation strategy. The TEMP is prepared as 
early as possible in the acquisition process (normally before Milestone I), and is designed 
to identify and integrate objectives, responsibilities, resources, and schedule for all test 
and evaluation to be accomplished before key decision milestones. There were no 
milestone decisions to be made in this program and the SPO working with the TIWG 
streamlined the testing requirements considerably. The SPO waived some of the critical 
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tests (shock and vibration, and temperature cycling) due to time constraints, which later 
proved to delay the program. 
The third difference was in monitoring of the tests conducted. The tests 
were always done by the contractor and monitored by the Government. In the AN/TSC-
143 case, the Government was represented by technical personnel from CECOM who 
were considered matrix support to the SPO and project leader. The question of bias 
comes into play with the PMO influencing how the test results are presented. The results 
from the tests were key in deciding if the terminals were ready to be shipped to the 269th 
Signal Company. 
The fourth difference was that the AN/TSC-143 had to go through three 
separate certification processes. The three certification processes were for the on-board 
switch, military satellite system, and commercial satellite system. These certifications 
were performed by DISA and International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(INTELSA T). DISA is the agency that certifies that military communications equipment 
meets specific criteria before it is allowed into DoD's communications architecture. 
INTELSAT is the agency that certifies commercial satellite equipment for access on the 
INTELSAT satellite network. JITC is DISA's testing agency that performs the 
interoperability and standard parameter checks. The commercial satellite equipment had 
to be certified by a civilian agency, INTELSAT, since DISA was not authorized to certify 
commercial satellite equipment. 
b) Analysis 
There are several reasons why developmental testing was not conducted. 
First, the schedule constraint required delivery of a fully operational system within one 
year of notification. This required the SPO to limit testing to only what was necessary. 
Furthermore, some of the contractors had used their own IR&D funds to begin 
development of a prototype tri-band capable terminal. The contractors' prototype 
terminals were not fully developed when the Army's tri-band requirement was validated 
and approved. None of the existing commercial prototypes being developed had ever 
been independently tested or certified. This made developmental testing more of a 
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necessity. The combination of assurances by the contractors and the desire to acquire tri-
band capability influenced the decision to not conduct any developmental testing. 
Developmental testing is normally a series of FATs that would operate under the test-fix-
test concept until problems are resolved. Due to the unanticipated integration and 
reliability problems, the terminals went through more testing than was originally planned. 
According to the personnel in the PMO, some of the tests that should not have been 
waived were the shock and vibration tests as well as the temperature cycling tests. They 
felt that if these tests had been conducted earlier the terminals would have been fielded 
only a year past the required delivery date rather than 18 months. 
A TEMP was never required for this program. There were no milestone 
decision points to go through, nor was it necessary for the program to be entered into the 
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) for programming of funds. The schedule constraint 
drove the SPO and TWIG to an abbreviated test plan. The test plan was satisfactory in 
checking the progress of the equipment, but lacked some of the standard tests required 
for equipment to operate in a battlefield environment. Again, the shock and vibration, 
and temperature cycling test should have been included in the test plan. 
The monitoring of the contractor tests was done by CECOM matrix 
support personnel to accelerate the process. Many personnel in the program office felt 
the test community would make the schedule objective impossible. As a result, all the 
terminal testing was done with CECOM personnel monitoring and GTE personnel 
. performing, except the FIAT which was managed by TECO, an office under OPTEC. 
This placed the PM in a much better position to monitor and manage the schedule, but 
may have biased some of the decisions to continue early in the program. The SPO felt 
that an onsite representative at the Taunton plant full-time would ensure that problems 
were identified and corrected quickly. The fact that the CECOM representative was the 
matrix support to the program office could lead to biased test data. If problems were 
discovered during testing the SPO could pressure the test monitor to paint a better picture 
of the results. The test results provided by the test monitor influenced the decision to 
ship the terminals to Fort Huachuca in November 1994. The test monitor had reported its 
findings accurately, but had put a positive spin on the contractor's ability to correct the 
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deficiencies. The positive spin may have been provided as a result of the pressure to 
field the terminals on schedule. 
The certification requirement for communications equipment is to ensure 
that the new communications equipment is in compliance with the accepted military, 
domestic, and international interoperability standards and operating parameters. DISA is 
capable of certifying the equipment that operates on the military information 
infrastructure, but the equipment operating on non-military networks must be certified by 
the commercial equivalent ofDISA. In the AN/TSC-143 case, the INTELSAT 
organization is the commercial equivalent ofDISA for satellite access certification. 
Another concern that surfaced during the testing was the impact of the 
partially tested system in the hands of the using unit. This has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The advantages are that testing allowed the soldier to become familiar 
with the system and how it is supposed to work. The disadvantages are that if they were 
not brought in early on, they will probably develop a list of things they want added, 
modified, and deleted. Once the system has been produced it is difficult to accommodate 
any new requirements without extensive delays and added costs. This leads to extreme 
dissatisfaction and disappointment from the end user's standpoint. The user no longer 
feels a part of the equipment fielding team. Another disadvantage is that if the terminals 
were not fully tested, any failures, especially major ones, would lead to mistrust of the 
contractor; because the user would feel that the contractor was providing a substandard 
system. This stigma would follow the contractor at each subsequent step in the testing 
and acceptance of the terminals. 
The special project office for the system felt that the DCSOPS had too 
high an expectation for this NDI program. NDI based acquisition programs are presumed 
to reduce the time and funds required to field a system significantly. The expected 
reduction in time is continuously being pushed without any significant change in the 
required steps to procure the system. This places tremendous pressure on the Program 
Office to ensure the system's testing schedule is adequate and capable of meeting time 
constraints. Trying to include all required testing becomes difficult and is a primary 
concern in fielding a NDI system on schedule. The SPO felt that NDI programs will 
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continue to be tested in an accelerated fashion and that the tester must coordinate the test 
effort as early as possible. The SPO indicated that the advantages offered by the NDI 
based acquisitions were sometimes not being realized due to excessive testing and risk 
elimination. The SPO believed that the T &E community must look at the basis of a T &E 
program as risk management, not risk elimination. In addition, the SPO wanted the 
CBTDEV to develop a good set of requirements and then stick to them. Changing 
requirements severely affected the already intensive test schedule. The SPO believed the 
contractor should dedicate the right people to the test and concentrate on putting them at 
the right place during key test events. Although all agencies were involved and worked 
well together, the SPO stated that better management of the TIWG process could 
improve the results. 
4. Logistics Support 
a) Similarities and Differences 
The only logistics support similarity was the GFE. The GFE was already 
established in the Army inventory and required little coordination to obtain the required 
logistics support. 
Logistics support for the terminal's NDI components was managed quite 
differently from the standard process. The first difference was in the fact that this system 
was not type-classified, and therefore not managed under the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA). The second difference was in the expected life-span of the terminals, and the 
third difference was in the electronics industry's capacity to support the rapid turnover of 
technology at a much lower cost. 
The SPO's plan was to have the terminals fully supported by the 
manufacturer through exercise of contract options. The terminals were not type-
classified and were, therefore, outside the DLA management structure. The type 
classification is the Army's implementation of DoD requirement that an item is 
"approved for Service use" before expending procurement funds. Logistics support for 
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standard items is normally accomplished in the preproduction phase and is subdivided 
into maintenance and supply support. The manufacturer's support structure for the 
AN/TSC-143 terminal was divided into a two-level approach. At the first level the 
contractor's representative is on-site to do organizational and intermediate repairs. If a 
problem requires higher level repairs, the equipment is transported back to the second 
level of maintenance. The second level is the manufacturer's plant, which is equivalent 
to the military's Depot-level repair. The manufacturer's plant has the ability to rebuild 
the entire system. The original AN/TSC-143 contract allowed for maintenance options to 
be executed throughout the five year lifecycle of the AN/TSC-143. 
b) Analysis 
The standard type classification was not required due to the urgent 
operational requirement. Additionally, the limited procurement without further intent of 
additional procurement, would not qualify the AN/TSC-143 for adoption as standard type 
classification in the Army inventory. 
The support structure for the AN/TSC-143 was based on the terminal's 
expected lifecycle of five years. The constant turnover of technology has required the 
military to make decisions on whether to ( 1) spend billions of dollars to upgrade training, 
test equipment, and maintenance facilities, or (2) have contractor support equipment. 
The commercial industry can effectively and efficiently support equipment in most 
geographical areas with major repairs being performed at the manufacturer's plant. The 
rapid increase in technology and the electronics industry's ability to keep up with the 
changes allow many newer communications systems to be contractor supported and 
maintained at a much lower cost. The move to more contractor support may save the 
Army a tremendous amount of money in the training, test equipment, and facilities 
required to maintain state-of-the-art equipment. 
Another unique characteristic of the communications environment is that 
the commercial industry leads the military in its ability to produce and support state-of-
the-art technologies. Normally it is the military pushing the industrial base to maintain 
state-of-the-art; now it is public demand. Industry is now in the position of selling the 
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military already developed and proven commercial state-of-the-art communications 
capabilities as well as the maintenance contracts to support that capability. This results 
in increased competition and a decrease in costs to the Government" 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The acquisition environment surrounding small communications systems 
procurements is complex and dynamic. This chapter provided discussion and analysis of 
the similarities and differences between the standard developmental acquisition process 
and the AN/TSC-143 acquisition process. The areas covered were the management 
environment, external organizational influences, requirements generation, contracting, 
testing, and logistics support. The analysis provided some insight into why the processes 
were different. 
The management environment for the AN/TSC-143 program was one of a 
continuous increase in the number of programs while adjusting to the reduced work-
force, turnover, and restructuring of the procurement organization. This is illustrated by 
the fact that the Tri-band programs were initiated in October 1993 with the AN/TSC-143, 
and by April 1996 five additional Tri-band programs have been validated and approved. 
The five additional programs are being managed in the Tri-band Product Office with the 
addition of only two more project leaders. Each project leader is now responsible for two 
different Tri-band programs. 
The external organizational influences are unique to DoD's communications 
architecture. DoD's information infrastructure is extensive and includes every major 
weapon system procured. The military, domestic, and international standards and 
policies must be addressed before implementing a new communications system that will 
interface with the information infrastructure. Additionally, the rapid turnover of 
technology combined with the Army's Force XXI digitization initiatives requires 
extensive management of the Army's communications assets. 
The requirements generation process was different in that the tri-band capability 
was a byproduct of the LAM TF evaluation of the PowerP AC3 company concept. The 
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influences of the Signal Community helped justify the need for the PowerP AC3 company 
to have the tri-band capability. The verbal notification, which contained inadequate 
guidance in some areas while mandating unnecessary constraints such as NDI in other 
areas, is also typical in generation of communications requirements. 
The contracting process for the AN/TSC-143 procurement was an excellent 
example of how to award a contract efficiently. The teaming concept combined with the 
various tailoring initiatives made the entire contracting process a success. The drawback 
in focusing on the contract award date was the reduction in market research and lack of 
bid sampling. For a prototype program market research should have been extensive 
before determining what the performance requirements were to be. 
The testing process was also well-coordinated and sufficient. The problems were 
primarily generated from overly optimistic contractor proposals and inadequate market 
research. Having a representative from the program shop monitor the contractor testing 
may have biased the test reports that were being fed back to the PM, but additional 
checks and balances were in place to ensure that the terminals were not accepted unless 
they met the performance requirements as stated in the RFP. Any commercial 
communications equipment that will be operated on the battlefield should be subjected to 
shock and vibration, and temperature cycling tests. The certification process 
requirements ensured that the terminals would operate effectively in the commercial and 
military communications networks. The certification process went smoothly and caused 
no delays. 
The logistics support for communications equipment is shifting to more and more 
contractor support. The massive amount of communications infrastructure and rapid 
turnover of technology has increased the cost of the military maintaining its information 
infrastructure. With industry leading the military in state-of-the-art communications 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS- ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
• What is the current acquisition environment surrounding 
communications systems procurement? 
This research shows the procurement process used for communications programs 
is different in many ways from the standard developmental acquisition process. Most of 
differences are due to program size, organizational influences, and availability of 
commercial-off-the-shelf components. The progress in electronics technology and the 
availability of that technology for military applications has increased the need for 
continual replacement of systems that rapidly become antiquated. To take advantage of 
the rapid advance of technology, the communications procurement agencies have 
accelerated the standard developmental acquisition process. The managers of the 
program were empowered to use innovative techniques to meet the challenges facing this 
communications systems procurement. In the AN/TSC-143 case study, many of the 
formal processes were not required or were waived to meet the urgency requirement. 
The streamlined acquisition process combined with the reduction in system 
lifecycle and Force XXI initiative has significantly increased the number of programs 
under the PEO C3S. The growth in the number of programs combined with the reduction 
in personnel to manage the new programs increases the risk of making mistakes. More 
changes in procurement of communications systems will occur as technology advances 
and resources are reduced. Training and education of all procurement agencies and those 
organizations that influence the procurement process must continue in order to keep 
abreast of the most innovative and effective methods. 
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2. Subsidiary Questions 
• Why is the communications acquisition environment continually 
changing? 
Today' s acquisition environment has been dramatically transformed due to the 
reduction in resources provided by Congress. This has forced DoD to look for new ways 
to conduct its business. One of the key initiatives DoD has selected is to reform the 
acquisition process. 
The acquisition process is constantly changing in reaction to the external 
environment. The end of the cold war has shift the military's mission and reduced the 
resources it has enjoyed over the past few decades. The rapid development of new 
technologies has increased the need for modernization of our aging systems and has 
opened up many new opportunities to maintain our dominance on the battlefield The 
need for weapons modernization and force readiness requires that the acquisition of 
systems be done faster, with fewer people, and at a lower cost. 
The emphasis on Force XXI and the digitization of the battlefield following 
DS/DS has allowed communications systems procurement to lead the way in acquiring 
state-of-the-art equipment. The rate of technological advancement in commercial 
electronics has reduced the average life-span of military communications equipment to 
between five and ten years. Commercial technology becomes obsolete in about 18 
months, and that period continues to shrink. The turnover of technology combined with 
the Force XXI initiatives has led to an increase in the number of communications 
programs under the PEO. 
Combine the reduced life-span of electronic systems with a shrinking defense 
budget and the Army's increasing information requirements, and it becomes necessary to 
accelerate the acquisition process. The challenge is not only to do more with less, but to 
do it faster. Communications procurement agencies have been the initiator, as well as 
the test bed, for many new initiatives that let a user's requirement quickly become a 
reality. 
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Most previous communications systems acquisitions had followed the standard 
eight to 16 year acquisition process. The advances in commercial technology combined 
with the lower prices generated from the highly competitive electronics industry created 
the opportunity for the Army to quickly procure many state-of-the-art commercially 
available communications systems. The Army communications procurement agencies 
have been successful in reducing the time it takes to field a fully operational system. 
Some of the success can be attributed to the availability ofNDI equipment, but most of 
the success rests in the manager's ability to push new methods of meeting program 
requirements. The innovative methods allowed for rapid decision making and 
encouraged many of the acquisition processes to flow concurrently rather than 
sequentially. r 
In conclusion, the organizational influences on procurement of communications 
systems are important and must be included in the decision making process. Members of 
these organizations must be educated on acquisition reform and the acquisition process. 
The acquisition team must be empowered to lead the decision making process and 
develop an appropriate acquisition strategy. 
• What are the characteristics of this changing acquisition environment? 
Some of the unique characteristics of communications procurement are the 
organizations influencing the acquisition process, the growth in the number of small 
programs, industry's ability to push state-of-the-art technology to the military 
communications systems, and the speed in which state-of-the-art systems can be fielded. 
Additionally, significant restructuring of the procurement agencies and a consolidation of 
many PEOs and program offices have been conducted in order to use the limited 
personnel available more efficiently. 
• How does the ANffSC-143 program illustrate this environment? 
The AN/TSC-143 reflects this environment by the challenges that it faced and 
overcame: the push toward commercial products (mandated NDIICOTS strategy), the 
urgent need for this state-of-the-art capability, the limited funding resources provided by 
DCSOPS, and the willingness to use untested streamlining methods (IPTs, EBB) and to 
accept setbacks in the program as a result of these methods. 
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• How did the ANffSC-143 program proceed in this environment? 
The program proceeded exceptionally well considering the mandated constraints, 
the internal and external restructuring and downsizing, and the untested prototype's 
performance requirements. The involvement of the PEO, PM, and SPO during the early 
phases of the program was instrumental in shaping the process. The implementation of 
the IPT allowed a streamlined award process that resulted in no protests, although the 
decision not to conduct bid sampling prevented the PM from making a realistic 
assessment of the industrie's capabilities. The objective performance requirements were 
later found to be unrealistic for this type of procurement. The TRADOC community 
insisted that the prototype meet lhe initial requirements as stated in the RFP rather than 
establishing realistic and acceptable thresholds. The decision to forgo some of the 
critical shock and vibration tests, and temperature cycling tests to save time proved 
faulty. Had these tests been required in the RFP, many of the problems would have 
surfaced earlier and been resolved. The primary causes of the delays in the program were 
limited market research; lack ofbid sampling; lack of shock and vibration tests, and 
temperature cycling tests; and inflexibility of the performance specifications. Had the 
AN/TSC-143 been handled as a true prototype program, many of the requirements of the 
acquisition process would not have been reduced or waived. 
Although many problems were encountered, the program did field six state-of-
the-art terminals within a 30-month period. Thus, the normal acquisition cycle time was 
reduced from eight to 16 years to two and one half years. The program initiatives 
generated a number of lessons learned which will be used on the five tri-band systems 
that grew from the AN/TSC-143 program. A new contract, which uses the AN/TSC-143 
as its prototype, has already been initiated to replace existing military satellite terminals 
(TSC-93B and TSC-85B). This new program (STAR-T) will forgo some of the normal 
phases due to the AN/TSC-143 success and lessons learned. This next generation 
satellite terminal will be fielded as a joint terminal to the Army, Marine Corps, and 
JCSE. 
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• What can we learn from the AN!fSC-143 program about managing 
communications programs in this environment of rapid change? 
The challenge of this program was to procure a NDI system to be fielded as an 
operational prototype to a tactical unit. Combine the NDI strategy with an extremely 
tight schedule, limited budget, and "Best Value" competition requirement, and an 
unrealistic expectation is created. The unrealistic mandates create a highly stressful 
environment where even the most innovative streamlining techniques cannot achieve all 
the expectations. The tactical unit receiving the terminals, disappointed in the 
performance of the system, unsuccessfully attempted to push the AN!TSC-143 terminals 
to the battlelabs and test organizations to use as training aids [Ref. 32]. 
The AN!TSC-143 replacement program, STAR-T, will incorporate the lessons 
learned into its acquisition process, allowing it to skip over phase II. The following are 
lessons learned from the AN!TSC-143 case study: 
• Conduct thorough market analysis to evaluate industry's capability to meet 
desired performance requirements within cost and schedule constraints. The 
market analysis is critical in assessing the program risk areas and developing 
the appropriate acquisition strategy to mitigate those risks. 
• The program's acquisition strategy should be developed by the PM after 
market investigation is thoroughly conducted. The strategy should then be 
approved by the MDA rather than dictated from higher levels. Lobbying 
efforts by contractors, no matter how persuasive and optimistic, should not be 
part of the decision making process. 
• Be prepared to tell senior leaders about unrealistic constraints immediately. 
Realistically assess and report the chances of success given those constraints. 
The Army's "can do" attitude is appropriate in combat situations but must be 
kept in check in non-combat situations. The PM should not feel pressured 
into a "can do" attitude. 
• Avoid use of a NDI strategy for complex prototype systems with short 
schedule and/or limited funding. If mandated, then the CBTDEV must be 
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flexible on performance requirements that would prevent the system from 
being fielded on schedule and within cost. If a NDI strategy is mandated for a 
prototype system, then the system should be purchased basically "as is." 
• Keep program requirements focused on the original mission need. The 
CBTDEVenforced the STAR-T performance requirements on the AN!fSC-
143 so that it could be used as the prototype for the STAR-T. The unique 
mission ofPowerPAC3 may not have required these six terminals to meet the 
STAR-T requirements. 
• For a validated "urgent" requirement, attempt to get J&A for using other than 
a ''Best Value" solicitation. 
• Decide how important schedule (urgency) really is and reflect that throughout 
the source selection process to include the rating of evaluation factors. 
• Evaluate various contract types and methods to ensure the contractor has 
appropriate incentive to meet performance requirements. 
• In an urgent procurement required to use full and open competition, limit 
competitive range to offerors who have bid samples. Then conduct 
appropriate test and evaluation on those bid samples to determine which 
offeror has the best chance of meeting program objectives. 
• On limited procurements involve actual users early on, not just the user 
representative. This empowers the users, and provides them with a sense of 
ownership. A better understanding of the tradeoffs involved in the 
procurement may also result. 
• Continue use ofiPTs, tailoring, and EBB. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following issues are recommended for further study: 
• How can the PEO C3S properly manage the increase in the number of 
communications programs? What organizational changes are appropriate in 
an environment of downsizing. 
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• What is the impact of AMC MACOM personnel being recruited into the PEO 
to manage programs? The increase in the number of programs and a 
reduction in personnel has forced the PEO to use matrix support personnel to 
manage small programs. The majority of these individuals are GS-12/13 level 
individuals with program experience, but little formal acquisition education 
and training. 
• How effective are the streamlining initiatives on major communications 
programs? Acceleration of a small communications program is much easier 
as most of the processes are informal and review levels are below the PEO. 
• What are the organizations involved in communications procurement, and 
how do they influence the acquisition process? Communications 
requirements follow a unique approval process and are influenced by many 
organizations outside the procurement agency. 
• What are the long-term effects on the program from reducing the PAL T? Is 
there a point where significant risks are introduced? Many standard processes 
are accelerated or waived in order to focus on the short-term objective of 







































APPENDIX A- ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Army Acquisition Executive 
Acquisition Category 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association 
Army Material Command 
Army Material Systems Analysis Activity 
Acquisition Program Baseline 
Army Regulation 
Army Research Laboratory 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development & 
Acquisition) 
Advance Warfighter Experiment 
Best and Final Offer 
Battle Command Battle Lab (Fort Gordon) 
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Intelligence, and 
Electronic Warfare Sensors 
Contract Administration Office 
Commerce Business Daily 
Combat Developer 
Communications and Electronics Command 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Competition in Contracting Act 
Commander in Chief 
Cable News Network 
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
Critical Operational Issue and Criteria 
Commercial-Off-the-Shelf 
Chief of Staff, Army 
Commercial Space Package 
Department of the Army 
Defense Acquisition Board 
Deputy Chief of Staff Operations and Plans 
Defense Intelligence Agency 
Director oflnformation Systems for Command, Control, 
Communications, and Computers 
Defense Information Systems Agency 
Defense Management Review 







































Department of Defense Directive 
Department of Defense Instruction 
Defense Satellite Communications System 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
Development Test 
Developmental Test and Evaluation 
Deputy Under Secretary Army (Operations Research) 
Echelons Above Corps 
Electronic Bulletin Board 
Extra High Frequency 
Effective Isotropic Radiated Power 
Engineering, Manufacturing and Development 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
First Article test 
Firm Fixed-Price 
Field Installation Acceptance test 
Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation 
General Accounting Office 
Government Furnished Equipment 
General Officer Working Group 
Gain/Temperature 
Heavy High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle 
Independent Evaluation Plan 
Items for Negotiation 
Information Mission Area 
In-Plant Acceptance Test 
Independent Research and Development 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Communications Support Element 
Joint Interoperability Test Center 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force 
Lightweight Multiband Satellite Terminal 
Logistics Readiness Center 
Lieutenant Colonel 













































Major Automated Information System 
Milestone Decision Authority 
Major Defense Acquisition Program 
Major General 
Military Intelligence 
Military Strategic/Tactical Relay 
Mission Need Statement 
Major Regional Conflict 
Major Range and Test Facility Base 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment 
Modified Table of Organizational Equipment 
Non-developmental Item 
New Equipment Training 
National Security Agency 
Office of Management and Budget 
Operational Evaluation 
Operational Test and Evaluation Command 
Operational Requirements Document 
Office of the Secretary ofDefense 
Operational Test Agencies 
Procurement Administrative Lead Time 
Procuring Contracting Officer 
Procurement Data Package 
Program Definition and Risk Reduction 
Program Executive Officer 
Program Executive Officer Communications 
Program Executive Officer Command, Control, and Communications Systems 
Program Manager 
Program Management Office 
Program Manager Satellite Communications 
Product Manager Tactical Satellite 
Power Projection Army Command, Control, and Communications 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
Prototype Tactical Tri-band Terminal 
Research, Development and Acquisition 
Research and Development Center 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Request for Proposal 






























Service Acquisition Executive 
Small Business and Small Disadvantage Business Subcontracting Plan 
Super High Frequency 
Special Operations Force 
Special Operations Forces Tactical Assured Connectivity System 
Statement of Work 
Special Project Officer 
Source Selection Authority 
Source Selection Advisory Council 
Source Selection Evaluation Board 
Source Selection Plan 
SHF Tri-band Advanced Range Extension Terminal 
Space & Terrestrial Communications Directorate 
Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command 
Test and Evaluation 
Technical Evaluation 
Test and Evaluation Coordination Office 
Test and Evaluation Command 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
Test and Experimentation Command 
Test Integration Working Group 
Training and Doctrine Command 
Tri-Service Tactical Communications 
TRADOC System Manager 
Ultra High Frequency 
United States 
United States Army Information Systems Command 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) 
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APPENDIX B- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
Sequence of Events in the SHF Tri-band Tactical Satellite Terminal (AN/TSC-
143) also known as the Prototype Tri-band Tactical terminal (PT3): 
Aug 90 - General Vouno, Army Chief of Staff, initiated PowerPAC3 concept called 
Project 5/Directed Telescope to support operations in Saudi Arabia (Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm). 
Jun 91- Signal School reviewed lessons learned from DS/DS and attempted to 
initiate a tri-band terminal requirement. A lack of funds prevents any real 
progress in developing the concept into a prototype system. Some 
contractors begin to develop prototypes which meet the Signal Centers 
projected minimum requirements. 
Sep 93 - LAM TF CSP GOWG validated PowerP AC3 concept need for tri-band 
capability. California Microwave present products (STS terminal) currently 
available off the shelf. 
22 Oct 93 - PM SATCOM notified of urgent requirement for six tri-band terminals. 
25 Oct 93 - Special Project Office under PM SATCOM setup and staffed with matrix 
support personnel. 
5 Nov 93 - Signal Center completed first draft of AN/TSC-143 minimum requirements 
based on projected STAR-T requirements. 
8 Nov 93 -Emmett Paige, Asst. SecDef C31, issued Policy for use of commercial 
satellite communications as an outgrowth of the Congressionally-mandated 
Commercial Satellite Communications Initiative (CSCI). Additionally, the 
Army was tasked with development of the concept of operations (CONOPS) 
for the tri-band terminals NL T 15 Mar 94 
8/10 Nov 93-Met with DCSOPS to refine requirements, acquisition strategy. DCSOPS 
specifies they want "Best Value" competition rather than Sole Source. 
10 Nov 93- Announced program (synopsis) in Commerce Business Daily (CBD). 
22 Nov 93 - Conducted discussions with industry on requirements. Several contrators 
have already developed prototype terminals and are lobbying to get the 
Army to accept them. 
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23 Nov 93 - Conducted one-on-one discussions with potential offerors to get a feel for 
the markets capability (feedback) and ensure realistic requirements. 
26 Nov 93 - Emmett Paige issued guidelines for procurement and fielding of DoD 
tactical switched systems. This required all switches to be DISA certified. 
3 Dec 93 - MG Gray sent message moving fielding requirement for terminals to 30 Sept 
94 rather than the original date in FY96, the requirement is now made 
"urgent". This was due to a Post Cold War C2 study. MG Gray states that 
this is an opportunity to demonstrate rapid acquisition techniques. PACER 
(streamlining) initiatives are implemented. 
7 Dec 93 - Established EBB for program. 
9 Dec 93 - MG Gray provided two-page minimum essential requirements document to 
DC SOPS. 
10 Dec 93 - Placed two-page minimum requirements on EBB 
15 Dec 93 - Established Source Selection Board (SSEB and SSA only, no SSAC). 
16 Dec 93 - Initiated requests for GFE equipment to be delivered NL T 31 Mar 94 to 
awarded contractor. 
17 Dec 93 -Placed Statement ofWork (SOW) and third version of requirements with 
industry comments on EBB 
23 Dec 93 - Placed draft RFP sections B, L, and M on EBB. 
28 Dec 93 - PCO issued message on EBB requesting preliminary info from vendors to 
evaluate risk 
4 Jan 94 -Conducted pre-solicitation conference and one-on-one discussions with 
vendors 
6 Jan 94 -Received final comments from industry on all drafts via EBB 
11 Jan 94 -Completed Procurement Data Package (PDP) 
12 Jan 94 - Released RFP 
11 Feb 94- Received proposals from industry 
25 Feb 94- Completed initial proposal evaluation 
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1 Mar 94 - Competitive range (7 offerors) briefed to SSA. Released Items for 
Negotiations (IFN) 
8 Mar 94 - Received IFN responses and began interim evaluations ·· 
15 Mar 94 -Completed interim evaluations 
17 Mar 94 - Briefed SSA on interim evaluation findings (3 offerors in competitive 
range), requested BAFO and sent out model contract. 
21 Mar 94 - Received BAFOs 
22 Mar 94 - Completed final evaluations 
23 Mar 94 - Final evaluations briefed to SSA 
24 Mar 94 -Awarded contract 7 days ahead of planned schedule to GTE for $7,756,801 
Jun 94 -GTE uses their commercial TRI-SAT terminal during JWID 94 to see if it 
meets Army requirements. It failed the DSCS Certification 
31 Sep 94 - Scheduled date for delivery of 6 terminals slipped. PM SATCOM approved. 
17 Nov 94 - TM validation and verification and technical testing conducted by PM 
SATCOM and CECOM at GTE's Taunton plant 
18 Nov 94 - Mechanical integration of all six terminals completed. DCSC Certification 
completed by on-site DISA representative, John Rogers. Baseband in-plant 
acceptance test (IP AT) completed on three terminals. 
21 Nov 94-67 Engineering Action Requests (EAR) initiated so far, of which a dozen are 
technical performance limiting concerns. BG Gust allows four terminals 
that have passed IP AT to be shipped to Ft Huachuca on 28 Nov with the 
fifth terminal shipped 31 Jan 95 after completion of successful IP AT. 
Terminal six has been cannibalized and several components must be 
repopulated before it can begin IPAT, Estimate terminal six will be ready by 
30 Jun 95. 
5 Dec 94 - GTE provides revised TMs and prepares to start soldier training. One 
AN/TSC-143 has been diverted for displayed at Signal Symposium to gather 
support for the Tri-band program. 
16 Dec 94 - Closed 49 EARs of the current 70 EARs, 21 EARS still being worked. 
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19 Dec 94 - GTE institutes FRACA program on PT3 to track failures by cause, serial 
number etc. 
31 Jan 95 -Five terminals arrive Ft. Huachuca to conduct technicallesting followed by 
customer acceptance. Problems: 
Reliability (150 actual vs. 1000 hr MTBF requirement) 
Weight (323lbs overweight, 4600lb spec) 
Autotrack Control Unit (1 dB vs . .5 dB spec) 
Operating temp range ( -24 to + 110 F vs. -40 to + 160 spec) 
Flex Waveguide (raising and lowering antenna damages waveguide) 
Generators (89db at 2 feet exceeds safety level) 
13 Feb 95- Two operator classes of25 soldiers each begin 
Jun 95 - BG Gust and GTE decided that all terminals needed to be taken back to 
GTE's Taunton plant and repaired. 
25 Aug 95- One terminal sent to White Sands Missile Range for Temperature testing. 
8 Sep 95 - GTE plans to request waivers from initial specs on: 
Reliability (reduced to 400 hr MTBF) 
Weight (Increase spec to 4750lbs) 
Autotrack Control Unit (increase to 1 dB) 
Operating temp range (modify to -24 to+ 110 F) 
Generators (change operator location from 2 to 8 feet) 
Jan-Mar 96- Video teleconferencing held between 11th Sig. Bde, USAISC, SIGCEN, and 
PM SATCOM to monitor progress and make decisions on program. All 
problems except reliability resolved 
Mar 96 - All six terminals sent to Ft. Huachuca with three to be user tested 
Apr 96 - Training conduct on terminals, Primary Training Exercise (PTX) scheduled 
forMay96 
5 May 96- Terminals taken to Twenty-nine Palms for user testing by Ft. Gordon's 
TECO personnel. 
10 May 96 - PTX conducted, TECO personnel monitor the equipment 
15 May 96 - 269th Signal Company accepts terminals 
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